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Exchanges for Complex Commodities:
Toward a General-Purpose System for On-Line Trading
John Hershberger
ABSTRACT
The modern economy includes a variety of markets, and the Internet has opened oppor-
tunities for ecient on-line trading. Researchers have developed algorithms for various
auctions, which have become a popular means for on-line sales. They have also designed
algorithms for exchange-based markets, similar to the traditional stock exchange, which
support fast-paced trading of rigidly standardized securities. In contrast, there has been
little work on exchanges for complex nonstandard commodities, such as used cars or
collectible stamps.
We propose a formal model for trading of complex goods, and present an automated
exchange for a limited version of this model. The exchange allows the traders to describe
commodities by multiple attributes; for example, a car buyer may specify a model, options,
color, and other desirable properties. Furthermore, a trader may enter constraints on the
acceptable items rather than a specic item; for example, a buyer may look for any car
that satises certain constraints, rather than for one particular vehicle.
We present an extensive empirical evaluation of the implemented exchange, using
articial data, and then give results for two real-world markets, used cars and commercial
paper. The experiments show that the system supports markets with up to 260,000 orders,
and generates one hundred to one thousand trades per second.
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Economists dene market as \an arrangement which permits numerous buyers and sellers
of related commodities to carry on extensive business transactions on a regular, organized
basis" [Trenton, 1964]. The modern economy includes a wide variety of markets, from
cars to software to oce space.
The supply chain between a manufacturer and customer may include several middle-
men. For instance, customers usually buy cars through dealerships, which in turn acquire
cars from manufacturers; the sale of used cars may also involve dealers, who serve as
middlemen in the secondary market. This problem exists not only in broker-to-consumer
transactions, but also in broker-to-broker markets, where many transactions are slow and
require either salespeople on both sides or intermediary brokers. The most certain sign
of ineciency in the modern economy is the army of salespeople and brokers, who make
their living by acting as middlemen.
In addition, most items are bought and sold not only from the manufacturer, but
also on a secondary market, that is, they may be bought and re-sold multiple times. For
example, phone companies often re-sell unused phone minutes, and airlines re-sell unused
seats. Liquidity is essential, since the commodity may be lost if it is not sold by some
predetermined time. For example, unsold seats in an airplane become useless once the
airplane is o the ground. These resales increase the cost of goods, since they include
commissions for the middlemen. To improve the eciency of the economy, a more ecient
1
secondary market is necessary. This market would not require highly paid brokers and
middlemen, a signicant investment of time and eort, or a considerable risk of trading
at a sub-optimal price. The recent growth of the Internet has opened opportunities for
reducing the number of middlemen [Klein, 1997; Turban, 1997; Wrigley, 1997], and many
companies have experimented with direct sales over the web. Middlemen are also using
the Internet to increase the volume of their sales and reduce expenses. Furthermore,
many companies specialize in the development of electronic marketplaces, which include
bulletin boards, auctions, and exchanges.
Electronic bulletin boards are similar to traditional newspaper classieds. These
boards vary from newsgroup postings to on-line sale catalogs, and they help buyers and
sellers nd each other; however, they often require a user to invest signicant eort into
searching among multiple ads. For this reason, many buyers prefer on-line auctions, such
as eBay (www.ebay.com).
Auctions have their own problems, which include signicant computational costs,
transaction delays, and asymmetry between buyers and sellers. A traditional auction
requires a buyer to bid on a specic item. It helps sellers to obtain the highest price,
but limits buyers’ flexibility. A reverse auction requires a seller to bid on a customer’s
order; thus, it benets buyers, and restricts the sellers’ flexibility. Furthermore, auctions
limit the liquidity, that is, they may cause signicant transaction delays. For example, if
a seller posts an item on eBay, she can sell it in three or more days, depending on the
selected duration of the auction, but not sooner. Thus, auctions are not appropriate for
fast sales, which are essential in many markets.
An exchange-based market does not have these problems: it ensures symmetry be-
tween buyers and sellers, and supports fast-paced trading. Examples of liquid markets
include the traditional stock and commodity exchanges, such as the New York Stock Ex-
change and Chicago Mercantile Exchange, as well as currency and bond exchanges. For
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instance, a trader can buy or sell any public stock in seconds, at the best available price.
Although stocks have long served as an example of an ecient market, trading in other
industries has not reached this eciency.
The main limitation of traditional exchanges is rigid standardization of tradable
items. For instance, the New York Stock Exchange allows trading of about 3,100 securi-
ties, and the buyer or seller has to indicate a specic item, such as IBM stock. For most
goods and services, however, the description is much more complex. For instance, a car
buyer may need to specify a make, model, options, color, and other desirable features.
Furthermore, she usually has a certain flexibility and may accept any car that satises
her constraints, rather than looking for one specic vehicle. For example, she may be
willing to get any red Mustang with air conditioning.
Building an exchange for such complex commodities is a major open problem. An
eective trading system should satisfy the following requirements:
 Allow complex constraints in specications of buy and sell orders
 Support fast-paced trading for large markets, with millions of orders
 Include optimization techniques that maximize the traders’ satisfaction
 Ensure the \fairness" of the market, according to nancial industry standards
 Allow a user to select preferred trades among matches for her order
1.2 Example
We give an example of an exchange for trading new and used cars. To simplify this
example, we assume that a trader can describe a car by four attributes: model, color,
year, and mileage. For instance, a seller may oer a red Mustang, made in 1999, with
35,000 miles.
3
Red Mustang,
made in 2001,
0 miles,
$18,500
Fill:
Red Mustang,
made after 1999,
Any color Mustang,
Sell:
made in 2001,
0 miles,
more than $18,000less than $19,000
at most 20,000 miles,
Buy:
Figure 1.1: Matching orders and the resulting trade. When the system nds a match
between two orders, it generates a ll, which is a trade that satises both parties.
$18,000
Fill:
Mustang
Sell: Sell:
Mustang
$17,000$18,000
Buy:
$19,000
Mustang Mustang
Figure 1.2: Choosing the match with the best price.
The exchange allows placing buy and sell orders, analogous to the orders in a stock
market. A prospective buyer can place a buy order, which includes a description of the
desired vehicle and a maximal acceptable price. For instance, she may indicate that she
wants a red Mustang, made after 1999, with at most 20,000 miles, and she is willing to
pay $19,000. Similarly, a seller can place a sell order; for instance, a manufacturer may
oer a brand-new Mustang of any color for $18,000.
The exchange system searches for matches between buy and sell orders, and gener-
ates corresponding lls, that is, transactions that satisfy both buyers and sellers. In the
previous example, it will determine that a brand-new red Mustang for $18,500 satises
both the buyer and the seller (Figure 1.1).
If the system nds several matches for an order, it chooses the match with the best
price. For example, the buy order in Figure 1.2 will trade with the cheaper of the two
sell orders.
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Completely filled Partially filled
removed reduced
Mustang
Fill:
2 cars
Mustang
Mustang
2 cars
Sell:
2 cars
Mustang
Buy:
4 cars
Sell:
Figure 1.3: Example of order sizes. When the system nds a match, it completely lls
the smaller order and reduces the size of the larger order.
The system allows a user to trade several identical items by specifying a size for an
order. For example, a dealer can place an order to sell four Mustangs; then, the system
can match it with a smaller buy order (Figure 1.3) and later nd a match for the remaining
cars. In addition, the user can specify a minimal acceptable size of a transaction. For
instance, the dealer may place an order to sell four Mustangs, and indicate that she wants
to trade at least two cars.
A user can specify that she is willing to trade any of several items. For example, she
can place an order to buy either a Mustang or Camaro. If a user describes a set of items,
she can indicate that the price depends on an item. For instance, she may oer $18,500
for a Mustang and $17,500 for a Camaro; furthermore, she may oer an extra $500 if a
car is red, and subtract $1 for every ten miles on its odometer. A user can also specify
her preferences for choosing among potential trades; for example, she may indicate that
a red Mustang is better than a white Mustang, and that a Mustang for $19,000 is better
than a Camaro for $18,000.
1.3 Previous work
Economists and computer scientists have long realized the importance of auctions and
exchanges, and studied a variety of trading models. The related computer science research
has been focused on eective auction systems [Bichler, 2000b; Bichler and Werthner,
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2000; Ronen, 2001; Ronen and Saberi, 2002], optimal matching in various auctions [Ygge
and Akkermans, 1997; Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2000; Kastner et al., 2002], bidding
strategies [Tesauro and Das, 2001; He and Leung, 2001], and general-purpose systems
for auctions and exchanges. It has led to successful Internet auctions, such as eBay
(www.ebay.com) and Yahoo Auctions (auctions.yahoo.com). Recently, researchers have
developed several ecient systems for combinatorial auctions, which allow buying and
selling sets of commodities rather than individual items. They have considered not only
auctions with completely specied commodities, but also markets that allow the user to
negotiate desirable features of merchandise.
1.3.1 Combinatorial auctions
A traditional combinatorial auction allows bidding on a set of fully specied items. For
example, a buyer may bid on a red Mustang and black Corvette for a total price of
$40,000; in this case, she will get both cars together or nothing. An advanced auction
may allow disjunctions; for instance, a buyer may specify that she wants either a red
Mustang and black Corvette or, alternatively, two silver bmws. On the other hand,
standard combinatorial auctions do not allow incompletely specied items, such as a
Mustang of any color.
Rothkopf et al. [1998] gave a detailed analysis of combinatorial auctions and de-
scribed semantics of combinatorial bids that allowed fast matching. Nisan discussed
alternative semantics for combinatorial bids, formalized the problem of searching for opti-
mal and near-optimal matches, and proposed a linear-programming solution [Nisan, 2000;
Lavi and Nisan, 2000]. Zurel and Nisan [2001] developed a system for nding near-optimal
matches, based on a combination of approximate linear programming with optimization
heuristics. It could quickly clear an auction with 1,000 items and 10,000 bids, and its
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average approximation error was less than 1%. Hu and Shi [2002] later rened Rothkopf’s
analysis, helping to improve optimal matching in combinatorial auctions.
Sandholm [1999] developed several ecient algorithms for one-seller combinatorial
auctions, and showed that they scaled to a market with about 1,000 bids. Sandholm
and his colleagues later improved the original algorithms and implemented a system that
processed several thousand bids [Sandholm, 2000a; Sandholm and Suri, 2000; Sandholm
et al., 2001a; Sandholm, 2002; Sandholm and Suri, 2003]. They developed a mechanism
for determining a trader’s preferences and converting them into a compact representation
of combinatorial bids [Conen and Sandholm, 2001]. They also described several special
cases of bid processing that allowed polynomial solutions, proved the NP-completeness of
more general cases, and tested various heuristics for NP-complete cases [Sandholm et al.,
2001b].
Sakurai et al. [2000] developed an algorithm for nding near-optimal matches in com-
binatorial auctions based on a synergy of iterative-deepening A* with limited-discrepancy
search. It processed auctions with up to 5,000 bids, and its approximation error was un-
der 5%. Hoos and Boutilier [2000] applied stochastic local search to nding near-optimal
matches; their system could clear auctions with 500 items and 10,000 bids. Akcoglu et
al. [2000] represented a combinatorial auction as a graph; its nodes were bids, and its edges
were conflicts between bids. This representation led to the development of a linear-time
approximation algorithm for clearing the auction.
Fujishima proposed an approach for enhancing standard auction rules, analyzed
trade-os between optimality and running time, and presented two related algorithms [Fu-
jishima et al., 1999a; Fujishima et al., 1999b]. The rst algorithm ensured optimal match-
ing and scaled to about 1,000 bids, whereas the second found near-optimal matches for a
market with 10,000 bids.
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Leyton-Brown et al. [2000] investigated combinatorial auctions that allowed bid-
ders to specify a number of items; for instance, a buyer could bid on ten identical cars.
They described a branch-and-bound search algorithm for nding optimal matches, which
could quickly process markets with fteen item types and 2,500 bids. They later an-
alyzed the empirical hardness of optimizing combinatorial auctions, which can lead to
more consistent combinatorial auction benchmarks, and improved combinatorial auction
algorithms [Leyton-Brown et al., 2002].
Tennenholtz [2002] developed polynomial-time algorithms for nding optimal matches
in several types of restricted combinatorial auctions.
Lehmann et al. [1999] investigated heuristic algorithms for combinatorial auctions
and identied cases that allowed truthful bidding, which meant that users did not bene-
t from providing incorrect information about their intended maximal bids. Gonen and
Lehmann [2000, 2001] studied branch-and-bound heuristics for processing combinatorial
bids and integrated them with linear programming. Mu’alem and Nisan [2002] also inves-
tigated truthful-bidding combinatorial auctions, described conditions for ensuring truthful
bidding, and proposed approximation algorithms for clearing the auctions that satised
these conditions.
Xia et al. [2003] investigated multiple techniques of pricing bundles of goods and
market clearing, while ensuring the truthfulness of all bidders. They also studied various
methods of determining individual item prices, which is useful for evaluating combina-
torial auctions. They concluded that popular pricing mechanisms are too restrictive in
combinatorial auctions, and they fall short in guaranteeing truthful bids, which lowers
the optimality of the auction.
Yokoo et al. [2001a, 2001b] considered a problem of false-name bids, that is, manip-
ulation of prices by creating ctitious users and submitting bids without intention to buy;
they proposed auction rules that discouraged such bids. Suzuki and Yokoo [2002] studied
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another security problem in combinatorial auctions; they investigated techniques for clear-
ing an auction without revealing the content of bids to the auctioneer. They described
a distributed dynamic-programming algorithm that found matches without revealing the
bids to the auction participants or to any central \auctioneer" system; however, its com-
plexity was exponential in the number of items.
Andersson et al. [2000] compared the main techniques for combinatorial auctions
and proposed an integer-programming representation that allowed richer bid semantics.
Wurman et al. [2001] analyzed a variety of previously developed auctions and identied
the main components of an automated auction, including bid semantics, clearing mech-
anisms, rules for placing and canceling bids, and policies for hiding information from
other users. They proposed a standardized format for describing the components of each
specic auction.
Researchers have also investigated the application of auction algorithms to nonnan-
cial settings, such as scheduling problems [Wellman et al., 2001], management of resources
in wide-area networks [Chen et al., 2001], and co-ordination of services performed by dif-
ferent companies [Preist et al., 2001].
The reader may nd a detailed survey of combinatorial auctions in the review article
by de Vries and Vohra [2001]. Although the developed systems can eciently process
several thousand bids, their running time is super-linear in the number of bids, and they
do not scale to larger markets.
1.3.2 Advanced semantics
Several researchers have studied techniques for specifying the dependency of an item price
on the number and quality of items. They have also investigated techniques for processing
\flexible" bids, specied by hard and soft constraints. Moore et al. [1990] gave a decision-
theoretic approach to information retrieval, in which the best available record in a le is
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retrieved based on user prefereces. The primary drawback of their method is that some
user preferences are not representable according to their restrictions. Cagno et al. [2001]
studied the probability of winning in competitive bidding with multi-attribute decision
making techniques. Uncertainty stemmed from the evaluation criteria of the seller and
the bidding proles of the competing bidders. They described a technique that accounts
for this uncertainty and attempts to maximize the probability of a winning bid, based on
current knowledge of the seller and competitors.
Che [1993] analyzed auctions that allowed negotiating not only the price but also
the quality of a commodity. A bid in these auctions was a function that specied a desired
trade-o between price and quality. Cripps and Ireland [1994] considered a similar setting
and suggested several strategies for bidding on price and quality.
Sandholm and Suri [2001b] described a mechanism for imposing nonprice constraints
in combinatorial auctions, such as budget constraints and limit on the number of win-
ners; they showed that these constraints sometimes increased the auction complexity,
and sometimes reduced the complexity. They have also studied combinatorial auctions
that allowed bulk discounts [Sandholm and Suri, 2001a]; that is, they enabled a bidder
to specify a dependency between item price and order size. Lehmann et al. [2001] also
considered the dependency of price on order size, showed that the corresponding problem
of nding best matches was np-hard, and developed a greedy approximation algorithm.
Bichler discussed a market that would allow negotiations on any attributes of a
commodity [Bichler and Kaukal, 1999; Bichler et al., 1999; Bichler, 2000a]; for instance, a
car buyer could set a xed price and negotiate the options and service plan. He analyzed
several alternative versions of this model, and concluded that it would greatly increase
the economic utility of auctions; however, he pointed out the diculty of implementing
it and did not propose any computational solution.
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Jones extended the semantics of combinatorial auctions and allowed buyers to use
complex constraints [Jones, 2000; Jones and Koehler, 2000; Jones and Koehler, 2002]; for
instance, a car buyer could bid on a vehicle that was less than three-years old, or on the
fastest available vehicle. They suggested an advanced semantics for these constraints,
which allowed compact description of complex bids; however, they did not allow com-
plex constraints in sell orders. They implemented an algorithm that found near-optimal
matches, but it scaled only to one thousand bids.
Tewari et al. [2003] devised a location-based brokering scheme allowing for geograph-
ically nearby bidders to gain preference over those bidding from afar. Their system was
useful for markets in which fast delivery is essential, such as restaurants and \impulse
shopping" from consumers.
Boutilier and Hoos [2001] developed a general propositional language for specifying
bids in combinatorial auctions, which allowed a compact representation of most bids. Co-
nen and Sandholm [2002] described a system that helped the participants of combinatorial
auctions to specify their bids; it elicited the preferences of an auction participant and used
them to dene appropriate bids. Burmeister et al. [2002] designed a \package-oriented"
approach to bidding in multi-attribute auctions. A package consisted of a combination
of multiple attributes, which the buyer assigns a value to as a whole, rather than to
each attribute separately. However, in this approach the individual attribute evaluations
become transparent to the seller.
This initial work leaves many open problems, which include the use of complex
constraints with general preference functions, symmetric treatment of buy and sell orders,
and design of ecient matching algorithms for advanced semantics.
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1.3.3 Exchanges
Economists have extensively studied traditional stock exchanges; for example, see the
historical review by Bernstein [1993] and the textbook by Hull [1999]. They have focused
on exchange dynamics and related mathematics, rather than on ecient algorithms [Cason
and Friedman, 1996; Cason and Friedman, 1999; Bapna et al., 2000]. Several computer
scientists have also studied trading dynamics and proposed algorithms for nding the
market equilibrium [Reiter and Simon, 1992; Cheng and Wellman, 1998; Andersson and
Ygge, 1998].
Successful on-line exchanges include electronic communication networks, such as
redi (www.redibook.com) and Island (www.island.com). In addition to the securities
exchanges, exchanges for other goods and services have been developed. For instance,
GreenOnline (www.greenonline.com) allows traders to exchange goods and services
within a variety of environmental markets. These environmental exchanges are specialized
auctions in which public, private, and non-prot buyers and sellers trade environmental
pollution credits, assets associated with regulatory osets, and other goods and services.
Keever and Alcorn [2000] gives a brief overview of the evolution of GreenOnline and
environmental exchanges.
Contreras et al. [2001] built a system to simulate the power exchange market of a
deregulated electric energy industry. Bidding proposals and interaction between supplier
and consumer was simulated. The system could be used to evaluate how the selection
of winning bids depends on the auction model used in the exchange. Richter and She-
ble [1998] developed a system composed of companies buying and selling power in a
regional exchange. Genetic algorithms encoded the bidding strategies used by traders,
and the bidding strategies adapted as the traders’ behavior changed. The system was
useful for evaluating whether or not a bidding strategy will be successful in a practical
electricity exchange; however, the system’s use in other markets has not been determined.
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The directors of large stock and commodity exchanges are also considering elec-
tronic means of trading. For example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange has deployed the
Globex system, which supports trading around the clock. Weinhardt and Gomber [1999]
developed a prototype multi-agent system for automating single auctions within an o-
exchange bond market. The agents widened the search space of potential traders, accel-
erated the trading process, and helped reduce the need for intermediary brokers.
Some auction researchers have investigated the related theoretical issues; they have
viewed exchanges as a variety of auction markets, called continuous double auctions. In
particular, Wurman et al. [1998a] proposed a theory of exchange markets and imple-
mented a general-purpose system for auctions and exchanges, which processed traditional
fully specied orders. Sandholm and Suri [2000] developed an exchange for combinatorial
orders, but it could not support markets with more than 1,000 orders. Blum et al. [2002]
explored methods for improving liquidity of standardized exchanges. Kalagnanam et
al. [2000] investigated techniques for placing orders with complex constraints and identi-
fying matches between them. They developed network-flow algorithms for nding optimal
matches in simple cases, and showed that more complex cases were np-complete. The
complexity of their algorithms was super-linear in the number of orders, and the resulting
system did not scale beyond a few thousand orders.
The related open problems include development of scalable systems for large com-
binatorial markets, as well as support for flexible orders with complex constraints.
1.3.4 General-purpose systems
Computer scientists have developed several systems for auctions and exchanges, which
vary from specialized markets to general-purpose tools for building new markets. The
reader may nd a survey of most systems in the review articles by Guttman et al. [1998a,
1998b], Maes et al. [1999], and Huhns and Vidal [1999].
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Kumar and Feldman [1998] built an Internet-based system that supported several
standard auctions, including open-cry auctions, single-round sealed-bid auctions, and
multiple-round auctions. Chavez and his colleagues designed an on-line agent-based auc-
tion; they built intelligent agents that negotiated on behalf of buyers and sellers [Chavez
and Maes, 1996; Chavez et al., 1997]. Vetter and Pitsch [1999] constructed a more
flexible agent-based system that supported several types of auctions. Preist [1999a;
1999b] developed a similar distributed system for exchange markets. Bichler designed
an electronic brokerage service that helped buyers and sellers to nd each other and to
negotiate through auction mechanisms [Bichler et al., 1998; Bichler and Kaukal, 1999;
Bichler and Segev, 1999]. Bichler later developed an advanced decision analysis engine
capable of incorporating many attributes into bid selection [Bichler et al., 2001]. The
system was able to make proper decisions with hundreds of bids, and only required the
user to initially rank a subset of the bids on desirability.
Benyoucef et al. [2001] considered a problem of simultaneous negotiations for in-
terdependent goods in multiple markets, and applied a workflow management system to
model the negotiation process. Their system helped a user to purchase a combinatorial
package of goods in noncombinatorial markets. Boyan et al. [2001] also built a system for
simultaneous bidding in multiple auctions; they applied beam search with simple heuris-
tics to the problem of buying complementary goods in dierent auctions. Babaio and
Nisan [2001] studied the problem of integrating multiple auctions across a supply chain,
and proposed a mechanism for sharing information among such auctions. Piccinelli et
al. [2001] designed a distributed negotiation system allowing service providers to sub-
contract aspects of its service to other providers, and determine the price to pay each.
Service roles were negotiated within a reverse-combinatorial-auction, in which potential
subcontractors bid on combinations of service roles of the original service provider.
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Dumas et al. [2002] presented a formal model of negotiating agent behavior, consist-
ing of numerous modules and a knowledge base. The model helped in the development
of agents able to carry out simultaneous negotiations; however, communication between
agents was limited to simple messages, and it did not allow transmitting trading rules.
Wurman and Wellman built a general-purpose system, called the Michigan Inter-
net AuctionBot, that could run a variety of dierent auctions [Wellman, 1993; Wellman
and Wurman, 1998; Wurman et al., 1998b; Wurman and Wellman, 1999]; however, they
restricted the users to simple fully specied bids. Their system included scheduler and
auctioneer procedures, related databases, and advanced interfaces. Hu et al. [1999] cre-
ated agents for bidding in the Michigan AuctionBot; they used regression and learning
techniques to predict the behavior of other bidders. Later, Hu et al. [2000] designed three
types of agents and showed that their relative performance depended on the strategies of
other auction participants.
Rahwan et al. [2002] created trading agents that would each individually negotiate
with other traders, and a coordinating agent to direct any further action. In this sys-
tem, agents could be introduced or removed dynamically; however, the trading agents
had no knowledge of each other’s progress. Hu and Wellman [2001] developed an agent
that learned the behavior of its competitors and adjusted its strategy accordingly. Wur-
man [2001] considered a problem of building general-purpose agents that simultaneously
bid in multiple auctions.
Cli [1998] designed agents that utilized genetic algorithms in order to optimize
their bidding strategies. The genetic algorithms automated the setting of a learning rate,
which was dened as the rate at which the system adjusts its output toward some target
output. He later showed that a genetic algorithm could also optimize the particular
market mechanism under which the trader agents operate [Cli, 2002]. Sample market
mechanisms include the continuous double auction, Dutch auction, and English auction.
15
The genetic algorithm was able to evolve traditional market mechanisms into new hybrid
mechanisms, which had no real-world representation; thus, they were only suited for
articial traders.
Parkes built a fast system for combinatorial auctions, but it worked only for markets
with up to one hundred users [Parkes, 1999; Parkes and Ungar, 2000]. Sandholm created
a more powerful auction server, congurable for a variety of markets, and showed its
ability to process several thousand bids [Sandholm, 2000a; Sandholm, 2000b; Sandholm
and Suri, 2000].
Maamar [2002] investigated the abilities required for a software agent to perform ad-
equately in an auction setting. He found that agent-based e-commerce systems required
human interaction at multiple stages of the trading process, concluding that further re-
search is needed before fully automated e-commerce support becomes realistic.
All these systems have the same limitation as commercial on-line exchanges; they
require fully specied bids and do not support the use of constraints.
1.3.5 Industrial systems
Several companies have released software products useful in the e-commerce industry.
These systems can typically be used to provide e-Sourcing solutions for businesses around
the world. e-Sourcing refers to the process by which a company determines the optimal
distributor(s) from which to buy its supply of a needed commodity, with optimality
based on buyer preferences. The e-Sourcing process usually involves order planning,
RFQ generation, RFQ evaluation, negotiation, settlement, and order execution. With
the creation and evaluation of an RFQ (Request-for-Quote) comes the need for a decision
support and auction system to determine which bid the buyer should purchase from. An
optimal sourcing mechanism will result in lower total acquisition costs for the buyer.
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ibm Research has developed the Multidimensional Analysis Platform, or map, to
provide decision support for e-Sourcing. map consists of tools to elicit buyer preferences
for multi-attribute bid evaluation using decision analysis techniques, a bid evaluation
engine that determines the optimal set of bids a buyer should accept, and a visualization
tool to compare multiple bids across multiple attributes. In addition, the system may be
linked to an existing auction platform to carry out complex auctions for practical business
trading.
The Emptoris Sourcing Platform from Emptoris and the Prot Optimization Suite
from Rapt are e-Sourcing systems that provide commercial bid analysis via integer pro-
gramming and constraint programming. These products analyze bids from multiple sup-
pliers, and then select an optimal set of bids, based on user preferences. These products
are well-suited for simple objectives, such as minimizing the total cost for the buyer.
However, these systems do not handle the optimization of multiple attributes well, which
is vital in the trading of complex commodities. Moreover, these systems also do not
give users a thorough explanation of results, and they do not allow users to readily look
through the available bids themselves.
Another approach to bid-analysis may be found in Frictionless Commerce’s Enter-
prise Software and Perfect Commerce’s Perfect Application Suite. These systems carry
out complex decision making by decomposing complex decisions into smaller, simpler
pieces that can later be recombined into the larger aggregate decision. These systems
rely on the user to assign relative weights to dierent attribute values found in a poten-
tial bid. These weights may then be added to yield a numeric overall value for a bid.
The system then sorts the bids based on the their overall value and the user selects the
winning bids. The major drawback with this approach is that it relies heavily on the
appropriate setting of weights by the user, which is often hard to guarantee. The user
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normally has little help in assigning relative weights, and will encounter diculty when
the number of attributes grows into the dozens.
California Software Company, Ltd. released the eBiz Market Server software, which
includes engines for both auctions and exchanges. The eBiz Auction Engine supports
several popular auction types, such as Dutch, English, and Sealed Bid. The software can
be used to provide an auction platform for business trading. The eBiz Exchange Engine
provides an exchange architecture that allows for periodic clearing and continuous clearing
exchanges. The exchange can return to a trader the best matching orders in the system,
and traders can then commence negotiation and order execution. The eBiz Market Server
software also oers e-Sourcing solutions via its RFQ Engine. Businesses may investigate
potential suppliers based on specied criteria, and the system can determine the optimal
set of suppliers for the buyer.
TripleHop Technologies developed the ShopMatcher software, which uses articial
intelligence methods to learn the buying behavior of a potential customer. ShopMatcher
learns a customer’s shopping patterns with repeated transactions with the consumer. It
then adapts itself to meet the demands of the consumer by making product recommen-
dations that are most apt to lead to a transaction. This enhances the trading experience
for both the buyer and seller, allowing the consumer to quickly nd what she is looking
for, while increasing the seller’s chances of completing a transaction. For companies with
a large number of online customers, this technology could lead to increased revenue.
1.3.6 Contributions
The review of previous work has shown that techniques for trading complex commodi-
ties are still limited. Researchers have investigated several auction models, as well as
exchanges for standardized securities, but they have not applied the exchange model to
complex goods. The main open problems are (1) design of an automated exchange for
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complex securities, (2) analysis of related trading rules, and (3) development of a rig-
orous theory of complex exchanges. The work reported here is a step toward addressing
these problems.
A recent project at the University of South Florida has been aimed at developing
an electronic exchange for complex goods. Johnson [2001] has dened related trading
semantics and developed an exchange system that supports a market with 300,000 or-
ders. Hu [2002] has extended order semantics and developed indexing structures for fast
identication of matches between buy and sell orders. Gong [2002] has developed algo-
rithms for fast identication of most preferable matches, which maximize the satisfaction
of market participants.
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Chapter 2
General Exchange Model
We describe a general model of trading complex commodities, using an example car
market. We formalize the concept of buy and sell orders, consider a trading environment
that allows hard and soft constraints in the order specication, and discuss methods for
representing combinations of purchases and sales. In Chapters 3 and 4, we present an
automated exchange supporting a limited version of this general model.
2.1 Orders
We begin by dening buy and sell orders, which include descriptions of commodities, price
and size specications, and traders preferences among acceptable transactions. We then
state conditions of a match between a buy order and sell order.
2.1.1 Buyers and sellers
When a buyer looks for a certain item, she usually has some flexibility; that is, she is
willing to buy any of several acceptable items. For example, suppose that a buyer is
looking for a sports car; then, she may be willing to buy one of several models, such as
a Corvette, Camaro, or Viper. For each of these models, the buyer has to determine the
maximal acceptable price. In addition, a buyer usually has preferences among acceptable
items; for instance, the buyer may prefer Corvettes to other models, and she may prefer
black cars to red ones. The preferences may depend on the price, features, or other
factors, such as service quality or delivery date.
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Similarly, when a dealer sells a vehicle she has to decide on a minimal acceptable
price. For instance, a seller may be selling a Camaro for no less than $15,000 and a
Corvette for no less than $20,000. If the seller oers multiple items, she may prefer some
sales to others. For example, a seller may prefer to sell the Corvette for $20,000, rather
than the Camaro for $15,000. If the buyer came to the seller to purchase a sports car,
then the seller would try to sell the Corvette before oering the Camaro.
If a buyer’s constraints match a seller’s constraints, then they may trade; that is,
the buyer may purchase an item from the seller. If a buyer nds several acceptable items,
possibly provided by dierent sellers, she will buy the best available item, where the
notion of \best" depends on her subjective preferences. Likewise, a seller may be able to
choose the most attractive deal among several oers.
We use the term buy order to refer to a buyer’s set of constraints, particularly
requirements and preferences. For example, a buyer’s wish to purchase a sports car can
be expressed as an order for a sports car, and her price limits and preferences will be
a part of this order. When a buyer announces her desire to trade, we say that she has
placed an order.
Similarly, a sell order is a seller’s set of constraints, dening the oered merchandise.
For example, a seller may place an order to sell a Camaro or Corvette, and her order may
also include price limits and preferences. If a buy and sell order match, they may result
in a trade between the corresponding parties.
2.1.2 Denition of an order
A specic market includes a certain set of items that can potentially be bought and sold;
we denote it by M, which stands for market set . This set may be very large or even
innite; in the car market, it includes all vehicles that have ever been made, as well as
the cars that can be made in the future. The choice of a market set limits the objects
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that may be traded, but it does not guarantee that all of the objects will be trade. For
instance, if we restrict M to cars, the market will not allow trading of bicycles or golf
carts. On the other hand, if the market includes an item such as a Star Wars pod racer,
it may never be traded.
When a customer makes a purchase or sale, she needs to specify a set of acceptable
items, denoted I, which stands for item set; it must be a subset of M, that is, I  M.
For example, if a buyer shops for a brand-new sports car, then her set I includes all new
sports vehicles.
In addition, a customer should specify a limit on the acceptable price, which may
depend on specic items in I. For instance, a buyer may be willing to pay $17,000 for a red
Mustang, but only $16,000 for a black Mustang, and even less for a Camaro. Formally,
a price limit is a real-valued function dened on the set I, whose values are nonnegative;
for each item i 2 I, it denes a certain limit, Price(i). If a customer is buying an item,
then Price(i) is the maximal acceptable price. For a seller, on the other hand, it is the
minimal acceptable price. To summarize, a buy or sell order must include two elements
(see Figure 2.1a):
 a set of items, I  M, and
 a price function, Price : I ! R,
where R is the set of nonnegative real-valued prices.
The prices in consumer markets are usually in dollars or other currencies; however,
traders in some specialized markets may use dierent price measures. For example, mort-
gage brokers often view the interest rate as the price of a mortgage. The properties of
such price measures may dier from those of dollar prices. In particular, the price may
not be additive; for instance, if a customer takes a 8% loan and a 6% loan, the overall
interest is not 14%.
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Figure 2.1: An example of a buy order (a) and a match (b). The horizontal plane
represents the market set M, and the vertical axis is price R. The buyer is interested
in a certain set Ib of cars, with dierent price limits; in particular, she would buy a red
Mustang for $20,000. Her order matches the sell order shown on the right.
We allow such price measures and do not require the use of dollar prices. The only
requirement is that a price increase always benets a seller, and a price decrease always
benets a buyer. In other words, the buyer is interested in nding the lowest available
price for a given item, whereas the seller tries to get the maximum possible price. For
instance, bank customers look for low-interest loans, whereas bankers try to get high
interests.
We say that a buy order matches a sell order if the buyer’s constraints are consistent
with the seller’s constraints, thus allowing a mutually acceptable trade (Figure 2.1b). For
example, if a buyer is willing to pay $20,000 for a red Corvette, and a seller is ready to
sell a red Corvette for $19,000, then their orders match.
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Formally, let (Ib; P riceb) be a buy order and (Is; P rices) be a sell order. These orders
match if some item i satises both buyer and seller, at a mutually acceptable price:
there exists i 2 Ib \ Is such that Priceb(i)  Prices(i):
2.1.3 Quality function
Buyers and sellers may have preferences among acceptable trades, which depend on a
specic item i and its price p. For instance, a buyer may prefer a red Mustang for $20,000
to a black Corvette for $22,000.
We dene these preferences as a real-valued function Qual(i; p), which assigns a
numeric quality to each pair. The larger values correspond to \better" items; that is, if
Qual(i1; p1) > Qual(i2; p2), then a customer would rather pay p1 for i1 than p2 for i2. For
example, a buyer’s quality function would satisfy the following inequality:
Qual(red-Mustang; $25,000) > Qual(black-Chevrolet; $20,000):
Each customer may use her own quality function; furthermore, she may specify
dierent functions for dierent orders. Note that we dene quality as a totally ordered
function, which is a simplication. In real life, customers sometimes reason in terms of
partially ordered functions. For instance, a buyer may believe that a $25,000 Mustang is
better than a $20,000 Corvette, but she may be undecided between a $25,000 Mustang
and an $18,000 Corvette.
Also note that buyers prefer lower prices, whereas sellers try to get as much money
as possible, which means that all quality functions must be monotonic on price.
 Buy monotonicity : If Qualb is a quality function for a buy order, and p1  p2, then,
for every item i, Qualb(i; p1)  Qualb(i; p2).
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 Sell monotonicity : If Quals is a quality function for a sell order, and p1  p2, then,
for every item i, Quals(i; p1)  Quals(i; p2).
We do not require a user to specify a quality function for each order; by default,
quality is dened through price. This default quality is a function of a transaction price
and its dierence from the users price limit. For example, buying a Toyota Echo for
$11,000 is better than buying it for $12,000; as another example, if a user has specied a
$12,000 price limit for an Echo and a $19,000 limit for a Mustang, then buying a Mustang
for $11,000 is better than buying an Echo for $11,000.
To formalize this rule, we denote the users price function by Price, and the price of
an actual purchase or sale of an item i by p. The default quality function must satisfy
the following conditions for every item i and price p:
 For buy orders: If Price1(i)  Price2(i), then Qual1(i; p)  Qual2(i; p).
 For sell orders: If Price1(i)  Price2(i), then Qual1(i; p)  Qual2(i; p).
Naturally, the larger the gap between the price limit and actual price, the better the deal;
that is, the more the user saves, the more she likes the transaction. Note that if the price
limit is a constant then the quality is simply based on prices, that is, a cheaper match is
better for a buyer, and a more expensive match is preferable for a seller.
We have considered two default functions, and a user can choose either of them.
The rst function is the dierence between the price limit and actual price:
 For buy orders: Qualb(i; p) = Price(i)− p.
 For sell orders: Quals(i; p) = p− Price(i).
This default is typical for nancial and wholesale markets; intuitively, the quality of a
transaction depends on a users savings. For example, suppose that a car dealer wants to
purchase either ten Mustangs for $19,000 each or ten Echoes for $12,000 each. Suppose
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further that she nds Mustangs for $17,500 and Echoes for $11,000. If she buys Mustangs,
she saves ($19; 000− $17; 500)  10 = $15; 000. On the other hand, if she acquires Echoes,
her savings are only ($12; 000 − $11; 000)  10 = $10; 000. Thus, the rst transaction is
more attractive.
The other default function is the ratio of the price dierence to the price limit:
 For buy orders: Qualb(i; p) = Price(i) − pPrice(i) .
 For sell orders: Quals(i; p) = p − Price(i)Price(i) .
This default is traditional for consumer markets; it shows a users percentage savings.
For instance, if a customer is willing to pay $19,000 for a Mustang, and she gets an
opportunity to buy it for $17,500, then the transaction quality is $19;000 − $17;500
$19;000
= 0:08.
If she is also willing to pay $12,000 for an Echo and nds that it is available for $11,000,
the quality of buying it is $12;000 − $11;000
$12;000
= 0:09, which is preferable to the Mustang.
2.1.4 Order sizes
If a user wants to buy or sell several identical items, she may include their number in
the order specication; for example, a buyer can place an order to buy two sports cars,
and a seller can announce a sale of one thousand Corvettes. We assume that the order
size is a natural number, that is, the market participants buy and sell whole items.
This assumption is somewhat restrictive, since it enforces discretization of continuous
commodities, such as copper or orange juice.
The user may specify not only the overall order size, but also the minimal acceptable
size. For instance, suppose that a wholesale agent for Chevrolet needs to sell one thousand
cars. Furthermore, she has no time for individual sales, and works with dealerships that
are buying at least ten cars at once. She may then specify that the overall size of her sell
order is one thousand, and the minimal acceptable size is ten. If the minimal size equals
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the overall size, we say that the order is all-or-none. For example, the agent may oer
ten cars and specify that her minimal size is also ten; then, she will sell either nothing or
ten cars at once.
In addition, the user can indicate that a transaction size must be divisible by a
certain number, called a size step. For example, stock traders often buy and sell stocks in
blocks of hundred. As another example, a wholesale agent may specify that she is selling
cars in blocks of twenty; in this case, she would be willing to sell twenty or forty cars, but
not thirty.
To summarize, an order may include six elements:
 Item set, I
 Price function, Price : I ! R
 Quality function, Qual : IR ! R
 Order size, Max
 Minimal acceptable size, Min
 Size step, Step
The item set, price limit, and size specication are hard constraints that determine
whether a buy order matches a sell order, whereas the quality function serves as both
hard and soft constraints. Rejection of a negative quality is a hard constraint, whereas
choice of large values among positive-quality transactions is a soft constraint.
To dene the matching conditions, we denote the item set of a buy order by
Ib, its price function by Priceb, its quality function by Qualb, and its size parame-
ters by Maxb, Minb, and Stepb. Similarly, we denote the parameters of a sell order by
Is;Prices;Quals;Maxs;Mins, and Steps. The two orders match if they satisfy the follow-
ing constraints.
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Sell: Sell:
$12,000
10 Echoes,
Sell:
10 Echoes,
at least 2,
$11,500
at least 5,
10 Echoes,
$11,000
Figure 2.2: Example of a bulk discount. If a dealer is oering a lower price for bulk
purchases, she has to place several orders with dierent prices and minimal sizes.
 There is an item i 2 Ib \ Is, such that Prices(i)  Priceb(i).
 There is a price p, such that
 Prices(i)  p  Priceb(i), and
 Qualb(i; p)  0 and Quals(i; p)  0
 There is a mutually acceptable size value size, such that
 Minb  size  Maxb,
 Mins  size  Maxs, and
 size is divisible by Stepb and Steps
The price and quality functions in this model do not depend on a transaction size,
which is a simplication, because sellers sometimes oer discounts for bulk orders. For
example, a car dealer may give a discount to a customer who purchases two cars at once,
and an even larger discount to a buyer of ve cars. In such cases, a seller can place several
orders with dierent price limits and minimal sizes, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. If a seller
wants to complete only one of these orders, she can use the disjunctive-order mechanism
described in Section 2.3.1.
2.1.5 Market attributes
The set M of all possible items may be very large, which means that we cannot explicitly
represent all items. For example, we probably cannot make a catalog of all feasible cars,
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since it would include a separate entry for each possible combination of models, colors,
features, and other attributes that describe a specic vehicle. To avoid this problem,
we dene a set M by a list of attributes and possible values of each attribute. As a
simplied example, we may dene a used car by four attributes: Model, Color, Year, and
Mileage. Then, a user describes a specic car by substituting values for these attributes;
for example, a seller may oer a red Mustang, made in 1998, with 30,000 miles.
Formally, every attribute is a set of values; for instance, the Model set may include
all car models, Color may include all visible wavelengths, Year may include the integer
values from 1896 to 2001, and Mileage may include real values from 0 to 500,000. The
market set M is a Cartesian product of these attribute sets; in this example, M = Model
ColorYearMileage. If the market includes n attributes, then each item is an n-tuple;
in the car example, it is a quadruple that species the model, color, year, and mileage.
The Cartesian-product representation is a simplication, based on the assumption
that all items in the market have the same attributes. Some markets do not satisfy this
assumption; for example, if we trade chariots and Star Wars pod-racers on the same
market, we may need two dierent sets of attributes. We further limit the model by
assuming that every attribute set has one of three types:
 A set of explicitly listed values, such as car models
 An interval of integer numbers, such as year
 An interval of real values, such as mileage
The value of a commodity may monotonically depend on some of its attributes. For
example, the quality of a car decreases with an increase in mileage. If a customer is willing
to buy a certain car with 20,000 miles, she will agree to accept an identical vehicle with
10,000 miles for the same price. That is, a buyer will always accept smaller mileage if it
does not aect other aspects of the transaction.
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When a market attribute has this property, we say that it is monotonically decreas-
ing . To formalize this concept, suppose that a market has n attributes, and we consider
the kth attribute. We denote attribute values of a given item by i1; : : : ; ik; : : : ; in, and
a transaction price by p. The kth attribute is monotonically decreasing if all price and
quality functions satisfy the following constraints:
 Price monotonicity : If Price is a price function for a buy or sell order, and ik  i0k,
then, for every two items (i1; : : : ; ik−1; ik; ik+1; : : : ; in) and
(i1; : : : ; ik−1; i0k; ik+1; : : : ; in), we have Price(i1; : : : ; ik; : : : ; in)  Price(i1; : : : ; i0k; : : : ; in).
 Buy monotonicity : If Qualb is a quality function for a buy order, and ik  i0k, then,
for every two items (i1; : : : ; ik−1; ik; ik+1; : : : ; in) and (i1; : : : ; ik−1; i0k; ik+1; : : : ; in),
and every price p, we have Qualb(i1; : : : ; ik; : : : ; in; p)  Qualb(i1; : : : ; i0k; : : : ; in; p).
 Sell monotonicity : If Quals is a quality function for a sell order, and ik  i0k, then, for
every two items (i1; : : : ; ik−1; ik; ik+1; : : : ; in) and (i1; : : : ; ik−1; i0k; ik+1; : : : ; in), and
every price p, we have Quals(i1; : : : ; ik; : : : ; in; p)  Quals(i1; : : : ; i0k; : : : ; in; p).
Similarly, if the quality of commodities grows with an increase in an attribute value,
we say that the attribute is monotonically increasing . For example, the quality of a car
increases with the year of making.
Note that monotonic attributes are numeric, and we cannot apply this notion to an
unordered set of values, such as car models. Also note that we do not consider partially
ordered attribute sets, which is a simplication, because some attributes may be \partially
monotonic." For example, Camry lx (a deluxe model) is denitely better than Camry
ce (a basic model), whereas the choice between Camry ce and Sienna ce depends on
a specic customer. In addition, observe that a monotonic attribute is a generalization
of price, that is, it may be subject for negotiation, with the other attributes xed. For
example, the shipping service may negotiate a delivery date.
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Theoretically, we can view the price as one of the monotonic attributes; however,
its use in the implemented system is dierent from the other attributes.
2.2 Order execution
We introduce the notion of a ll , which is a specic transaction between buyers and
sellers. We rst consider a trade between one buyer and one seller, and then dene lls
for transactions that involve multiple buyers and sellers. We use this notion to dene
conditions of an acceptable multi-order transaction.
2.2.1 Fills
When a buy order matches a sell order, the corresponding parties can complete a trade,
which involves the delivery of appropriate items to the buyer for an appropriate price. We
use the term fill to refer to the traded items and their price. For example, suppose that
a buyer has placed an order for two sports cars, and a seller is selling three red Mustangs.
If the prices of these orders match, the buyer may purchase two red Mustangs from the
seller; in this case, we say that two red Mustangs is a ll for her order. Formally, a ll
consists of three parts: a specic item i, its price p, and the number of purchased items,
denoted size.
If (Ib, Priceb, Qualb, Maxb, Minb, Stepb) is a buy order, and (Is, Prices, Quals, Maxs,
Mins, Steps) is a matching sell order, then a ll (i, p, size) must satisfy the following
conditions:
 i 2 Ib \ Is
 Prices(i)  p  Priceb(i)
 Qualb(i; p)  0 and Quals(i; p)  0
 max(Minb;Mins)  size  min(Maxb;Maxs)
 size is divisible by Stepb and Steps
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Note that a ll consists of a specic item, price, and size; unlike an order, it cannot
include a set of items or a range of sizes. Furthermore, all items in a ll have the same
price; for instance, a ll (red-Mustang, $18,000, 2) means that a buyer has purchased two
red Mustangs for $18,000 each. If she had bought these cars for dierent prices, we would
represent them as two dierent lls for the same order.
If both buyer and seller specify a set of items, the resulting ll can contain any item
i 2 Ib \ Is. Similarly, we may have some freedom in selecting the price and size of the
ll; the heuristics for making these choices depend on a specic implementation.
 Item choice: If Ib \ Is includes several items, we may choose an item to maximize
either the buyers quality or the sellers quality. A more complex heuristic may search
for an item that maximizes the overall satisfaction of the buyer and seller.
 Price choice: The default strategy is to split the price dierence between a buyer
and seller, which means that p = Priceb(i) + Prices(i)
2
. Another standard option is to
favor either the buyer or the seller; that is, we may always use p = Priceb(i) or,
alternatively, we may always use p = Prices(i).
 Size choice: We assume that buyers and sellers are interested in trading at the
maximal size, or as close to the maximum as possible; thus, the ll has the largest
possible size. This default is the same as in nancial markets.
In Figure 2.3, we give an algorithm that nds the maximal ll size for two matching
orders. The gcd function determines the greatest common divisor of Stepb and Steps
using Euclid’s algorithm. The main procedure nds the least common multiple of Stepb
and Steps, denoted step, which equals
Stepb  Steps
gcd(Stepb;Steps)
. Then, it computes the greatest
size, divisible by step, that is between max(Minb;Mins) and min(Maxb;Maxs). If no ll
size satises these constraints, the algorithm returns zero, which means that the size
specication of the buy order does not match that of the sell order.
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fill-price(Priceb;Prices; i)
The algorithm inputs the price functions of a buy and sell order, and an item i that matches both
orders.
If Priceb(i)  Prices(i), then return Priceb(i)+Prices(i)2 ;
else, return none (no acceptable price)
fill-size(Maxb;Minb;Stepb;Maxs;Mins;Steps)
The algorithm inputs the size specication of a buy order, Maxb;Minb; andStepb,
and the size specication of a matching sell order, Maxs;Mins, and Steps.
Find the least common multiple of Stepb and Steps:
step = Stepb  Stepsgcd(Stepb;Steps)
Find the maximal acceptable size, divisible by step:
size = bmin(Maxb;Maxs)step c
Verify that it is not smaller than the minimal acceptable sizes:
If size Minb and size  Mins, then return size
Else, return 0 (no acceptable size)
gcd(Stepb;Steps)
small = min(Stepb;Steps)
large = max(Stepb;Steps)
Repeat while small 6= 0:
rem = large mod small
large = small
small = rem
Return large
Figure 2.3: Computing the price (fill-price) and size (fill-size) of a ll for two match-
ing orders.
After getting a ll, the trader may keep the initial order, reduce its size, or remove
the order; the default option is the size reduction. For example, if a seller has ordered
a sale of three cars and gotten a two-car ll, the size of her order becomes one. If the
reduced size is zero, we remove the order from the market. If the size remains positive
but drops below the minimal acceptable size Min, the order is also removed. The process
of generating a ll and then reducing the buy and sell order is called the execution of
these orders. In Figure 2.4, we illustrate four dierent scenarios of order execution.
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3 cars
Fill:
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Figure 2.4: Examples of order execution.
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Sell:
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Fill:
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$11,000
Fill:
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$11,000
Sell:
3 Echoes,
$11,000
6 Echoes,
Fill:
1 Echoes,
$11,000
Fill:
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$11,000
1 Echo,
step 2,
Figure 2.5: Examples of multi-order transactions.
2.2.2 Multi-lls
If a user species a minimal order size, she may indicate that she will accept a trade
with multiple matching orders if their total size is no smaller than her minimal size.
For example, the buy order in Figure 2.5(a) does not match either of the sell orders;
however, if the user allows trades with multiple matching orders, we can generate the
transaction shown in Figure 2.5(a). If the user species the size step, then the total size
of a multi-order transaction must be divisible by this step (Figure 2.5b).
To formalize this concept, suppose that a buyer has placed an order
(Ib;Priceb;Qualb;Maxb;Minb; Stepb), and she is willing to trade with multiple sell orders.
Suppose further that sellers have placed k orders, denoted as follows:
34
(I1;Price1;Qual1;Max1;Min1; Step1)
(I2;Price2;Qual2;Max2;Min2; Step2)
. . .
(Ik;Pricek;Qualk;Maxk;Mink; Stepk)
Then, the buy order matches these k sell orders if they satisfy the following conditions.
 For every j 2 [1 : : : k], there is an item ij 2 Ib \ Ij, such that
Pricej( ij)  Priceb( ij)
 For every j 2 [1 : : : k], there is a price pj , such that
 Pricej( ij)  pj  Priceb( ij)
 Qualb( ij ; pj)  0 and Qualj( ij ; pj)  0
 There are acceptable sizes, size1; size2; : : : ; sizek, such that
 For every j 2 [1 : : : k], Minj  sizej  Maxj
 For every j 2 [1 : : : k], sizej is divisible by Stepj
 Minb  size1 + size2 + : : : + sizek  Maxb
 size1 + size2 + : : : + sizek is divisible by Stepb
Similarly, we can dene a match between a sell order and multiple buy orders. In
addition, we can allow transactions that involve multiple buy orders and multiple sell
orders, as shown in Figure 2.6. We will dene the conditions for such transactions in
Section 2.2.3.
We refer to the result of a multi-order transaction as a multi-ll, which is a set of
several lls for a given order. Since a multi-ll can include both purchases and sales, we
denote the purchase sizes by positive integers, and the sale sizes by negative integers. For
instance, the orders in Figure 2.6 get the following multi-lls:
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Sell:
$11,000
Buy: Sell:
$11,000
at least 2,
2 Echoes,
at least 2,
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Buy:
$11,000
1 Echo,
$11,000 at least 3,
3 Echoes,
Fill:
$11,000
Fill:
$11,000
Fill:
$11,000
2 Echoes,1 Echo, 1 Echo,
Figure 2.6: Example of a transaction that involves multiple buy and sell orders.
 Buy1: (Echo, $11,000, 1)
 Sell2: (Echo, $11,000, −1), (Echo, $11,000, −1)
 Buy3: (Echo, $11,000, 1), (Echo, $11,000, 2)
 Sell4: (Echo, $11,000, −2)
As another example, the multi-ll (Camry, $20,000, 1), (Echo, $11,000, −2) means that a
trader has bought a Camry for $20,000 and sold two Echoes for $11,000 each.
We say that two multi-lls have the same item set if they include the same com-
modities, not necessarily at the same price. For example, the multi-ll (Echo, $11,000,
1), (Echo, $12,000, 1) has the same item set as (Echo, $11,000, 2); in this example, both
multi-lls represent the purchase of two Echoes. As another example, (Camry, $20,000,
2), (Echo, $11,000, 1), (Echo, $12,000, −2) includes the same item set as (Camry, $20,000,
3), (Camry, $21,000, −1), (Echo, $11,000, −1); both multi-lls represent a purchase of two
Camries and sale of an Echo. Finally, we dene the empty multi-ll, denoted ;, as the
empty set of lls.
2.2.3 Equivalence of multi-lls
We next observe that dierent multi-lls may be equivalent from a traders point of view.
For instance, buying two Echoes for $10,000 each and immediately selling one of them for
the same price is equivalent to buying one car; that is, the multi-ll (Echo, $10,000, 2),
(Echo, $10,000, −1) is equivalent to (Echo, $10,000, 1). As another example, if two lls
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include the same set of items and the same total price, most traders would consider them
identical; thus, (Echo, $10,000, 1), (Tercel, $12,000, 1) is equivalent to (Echo, $11,000, 1),
(Tercel, $11,000, 1). If a multi-ll M-Fill1 is equivalent to M-Fill2, we write \M-Fill1 
M-Fill2."
An exact denition of equivalence may vary across markets. For example, if the
price is in dollars, buying two identical items for prices p1 and p2 is equivalent to buying
each item for p1 + p2
2
. On the other hand, if we consider the sale of mortgages and view
the interest rate as a price, this averaging rule may not work because of nonlinear growth
of compound interests.
To formalize the concept of equivalence, we rst dene the union of multi-lls, which
is the set of all transactions contained in these multi-lls. For example, the union of (Echo,
$10,000, 1) and (Echo, $10,000, 1), (Tercel, $12,000, 1) is a three-element multi-ll (Echo,
$10,000, 1), (Echo, $10,000, 1), (Tercel, $12,000, 1). This denition is dierent from
the standard union of sets since a multi-ll may include multiple identical elements. We
denote the multi-ll union by \+" to distinguish it from the set union:
(i11; p11; size11); : : : ; (i1m; p1m; size1m) + (i21; p21; size21); : : : ; (i2k; p2k; size2k)
= (i11; p11; size11); : : : ; (i1m; p1m; size1m); (i21; p21; size21); : : : ; (i2k; p2k; size2k).
A multi-ll equivalence is dened for a specic market, and it may be dierent for
dierent markets. Formally, it is a relation between multi-lls that satises the following
properties:
 Standard properties of equivalence:
 M-Fill  M-Fill (reflexivity)
 If M-Fill1  M-Fill2, then M-Fill2  M-Fill1 (symmetry).
 If M-Fill1  M-Fill2 and M-Fill2  M-Fill3, then
M-Fill1  M-Fill3 (transitivity).
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 A transaction that involves zero items is equivalent to the empty multi-ll:
(i; p; 0)  ;
 Buying or selling identical items separately, at the same price, is equivalent to buying
or selling them together:
(i; p; size1); (i; p; size2)  (i; p; size1 + size2).
 The union operation preserves the equivalence:
If M-Fill1  M-Fill2, then M-Fill1 + M-Fill3  M-Fill2 + M-Fill3.
These conditions are the required properties of the multi-ll equivalence in all mar-
kets; in a specic market, the equivalence may have additional properties. For exam-
ple, (i; p; 1); (i; p; 1) is always equivalent to (i; p; 2). On the other hand, (i; p1; 1); (i; p2; 1)
may be equivalent to (i; p1 + p2
2
; 2) in some markets, such as car trading, but not in other
markets, such as mortgage sales.
We use the concept of equivalence to dene conditions for a multi-order transaction,
such as the trade in Figure 2.6. Specically, we can execute a transaction that involves k
orders, denoted Order1;Order2; : : : ;Orderk, if there exist multi-lls M-Fill1;M-Fill2; : : : ;M-Fillk,
such that
 For every j 2 [1 : : : k];M-Fillj matches Orderj
 M-Fill1 + M-Fill2 + : : : + M-Fillk  ;
For example, we can select the following multi-lls for orders in Figure 2.6:
 (Echo, $11,000, 1) matches Buy1
 (Echo, $11,000, −1), (Echo, $11,000, −1) matches Sell2
 (Echo, $11,000, 1), (Echo, $11,000, 2) matches Buy3 item (Echo, $11,000, −2)
matches Sell4
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Figure 2.7: Example of price averaging.
The union of these multi-lls is equivalent to the empty multi-ll:
(Echo, $11,000, 1) + (Echo, $11,000, −1), (Echo, $11,000, −1)
+ (Echo, $11,000, 1), (Echo, $11,000, 2) + (Echo, $11,000, −2)  ;.
2.2.4 Price averaging
A trader may sometimes accept a multi-ll even if it does not satisfy the conditions of a
multi-ll. For example, consider the transaction in Figure 2.7. The price of the second
ll does not match the buy order, but the overall price of the two lls is acceptable.
The buyer pays $22,000 for two cars; thus, their average price matches the buyers price
limit. When placing an order, the trader has to specify whether she will accept such price
averaging.
Since the price may not be in dollars, we cannot directly compute the total price of
a multi-ll. For example, if the price of a mortgage is the interest rate, the overall interest
of a multi-ll is not the sum of its elements rates. To allow price averaging, we dene a
payment for a multi-ll. Intuitively, it represents a dollar amount delivered by a buyer or
received by a seller, and the units of payment may dier from price units. For example,
when a homebuyer negotiates a mortgage, she may use interest as a price measure; after
receiving the mortgage, she will repay it in dollars. Formally, a payment is a real-valued
function Pay on multi-lls that has the following properties:
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 If a trader does not buy or sell any items, the payment is zero:
Pay(;) = 0.
 The payment is proportional to the number of items:
Pay((i; p; size)) = size  Pay((i; p; 1)).
 The payment for multiple lls equals the sum of respective payments:
Pay((i1; p1; size1); : : : ; (ik; pk; sizek))
= Pay((i1; p1; size1)) + : : : + Pay((ik; pk; sizek)).
 Equivalent multi-lls incur the same payment:
If M-Fill1  M-Fill2, then Pay(M-Fill1) = Pay(M-Fill2).
 A buyers payment is monotonically increasing on price:
If p1  p2, then Pay((i; p1; 1))  Pay((i; p2; 1)).
Since a payment is monotonic on price, both buyers and sellers want to reduce their
payments. For buyers, this reduction means paying less money; for sellers, it means
getting more money, which is represented by a smaller negative value. For example, a car
seller would rather get the −$12,000 payment than the −$11,000 payment, which means
that she prefers selling her vehicle for $12,000 rather than for $11,000. A buyer’s payment
may be negative, which means that a seller pays the buyer for accepting an undesirable
item. For example, if the seller wants to dispose of a broken car, she may pay $100 for
pulling it away; in this case, the buyers payment is −$100.
Note that a payment depends not only on price but also on specic items; that is,
Pay((i1; p; 1)) may be dierent from Pay((i2; p; 1)). For example, the payment for a 6%
fteen-year mortgage is dierent from the payment for a 6% thirty-year mortgage. Also
note that the total payment of all transaction participants is zero. For example, consider
the trade in Figure 2.7. The buyer’s payment is $22,000, the rst selle’rs payment is
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−$10,000, and the second seller’s payment is −$12,000; thus, the overall payment is
$22,000 - $10,000 - $12,000 = 0.
We can decompose the payment for a multi-ll into the payments for its elements:
Pay((i1; p1; size1); : : : ; (ik; pk; sizek)) = size1Pay((i1; p1; 1))+ : : : +sizekPay((ik; pk; 1)).
To simplify this notation, we will usually write Pay(i; p) instead of Pay((i; p; 1)).
A user can also dene a quality function for multi-lls. Formally, it is a real-valued
function Qualm on multi-lls that satises the following constraints:
 If the user does not trade any items, the quality is zero:
Qualm(;) = 0.
 The quality function is consistent with the quality of simple lls:
 If size > 0, then Qualm((i; p; size)) = Qualb(i; p).
 If size < 0, then Qualm((i; p; size)) = Quals(i; p).
 Equivalent lls have the same quality:
If M-Fill1  M-Fill2, then Qualm(M-Fill1) = Qualm(M-Fill2).
 The multi-ll union preserves relative quality of multi-lls:
If Qualm(M-Fill1)  Qualm(M-Fill2), then
Qualm(M-Fill1 + M-Fill3)  Qualm(M-Fill2 + M-Fill3).
Recall that the quality of simple lls is monotonic on price (Section 2.1.3), which implies
that the multi-ll quality is also monotonic on price:
 If size > 0 and p1  p2, then Qualm((i; p1; size))  Qualm((i; p2; size)).
 If size < 0 and p1  p2, then Qualm((i; p1; size))  Qualm((i; p2; size)).
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If the user does not provide a multi-ll quality function, we dene it as the weighted
mean quality of a multi-lls elements. If the multi-ll includes purchases
(i1; p1; size1); : : : ; (ij; pj ; sizej) and sales (ij+1; pj+1;−sizej+1); : : : ; (ik; pk;−sizek), the de-
fault quality is:
Qualm((i1; p1; size1); : : : ; (ij ; pj; sizej); (ij+1; pj+1;−sizej+1); : : : ; (ik; pk;−sizek))
=
size1  Qualb(i1;p1) + ::: + sizej  Qualb(ij ;pj) + sizej+1 + Quals(ij+1;pj+1) + ::: + sizek  Quals(ik;pk)
size1 + ::: + sizej + sizej+1 + ::: + sizek
.
Now suppose that a trader has placed an order (I;Price;Qualm;Max;Min; Step),
and that she accepts price averaging. Then, a multi-ll (i1; p1; size1); : : : ; (ik; pk; sizek) is
acceptable if it satises the following conditions.
 i1; : : : ; ik 2 I
 size1  Pay(i1; p1) + : : : + sizek  Pay(ik; pk)
 size1  Pay(i1;Price(i1)) + : : : + sizek  Pay(ik;Price(ik))
 Qualm((i1; p1; size1); : : : ; (ik; pk; sizek))  0
 Min  size1 + : : : + sizek  Max
 size1 + : : : + sizek is divisible by Step
2.2.5 Fair trading
Fairness rules are based on the standards of the nancial industry: the users must get the
best available price for a given quality, the best price must be selected among competing
orders, and the system must prefer earlier orders when the price is equal.
Formally, fair trading must satisfy the following constraints:
 When an order gets a ll, there is no better ll on the market, according to the
order’s preference function.
 When an order gets a ll, there is no equally good ll on the market with an older
order.
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Note that these conditions do not guarantee optimization; for example, the maxi-
mum surplus , which is dened as the dierence between the respective buyer and seller
price limits, is not guaranteed.
A more general concept of fairness is based on the \boys-and-girls" condition. Specif-
ically, each order \wants" other orders, and the orders are prioritized. In this condition,
fair trading must ensure that when A matches B and C matches D, it is not the case that
(A wants D more than B) and (D wants A more than C).
2.3 Combinatorial orders
A combinatorial order is a collection of several orders with constraints on their execution.
A simple example is a spread , often used in futures trading, which consists of a buy order
and sell order that must be executed at the same time; for instance, a trader may place
an order to buy gold futures and simultaneously sell silver futures.
Combinatorial auctions allow larger combinations of bids; for example, a trader can
order a simultaneous purchase of a sport utility vehicle, trailer, boat, and two bicycles.
Some auctions also support mutually exclusive bids; for instance, a user can indicate that
she needs either a boat or two bicycles.
We describe combinatorial orders in the proposed exchange model, which include
mutually exclusive orders, simultaneous transactions, and chains of consecutive trades.
2.3.1 Disjunctive orders
A disjunctive-order mechanism is for traders who want to execute one of several alterna-
tive transactions. For example, if the buyer wants to sell one of her three cars, she can
place the order in Figure 2.8(a). As another example, if a buyer has a trailer, she can
either buy an old sport utility vehicle (suv) for pulling it or sell the trailer (Figure 2.8b).
We have to guarantee that a trader does not get lls for two dierent elements of a dis-
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Figure 2.8: Examples of disjunctive orders.
junctive order. For example, if a buyer places the order in Figure 2.8(a), she will sell at
most one of her cars.
If a trader species a size for some elements of a disjunctive order, these elements
must be all-or-none orders; that is, their minimal sizes must be the same as the overall
sizes. For example, a buyer may place an order to sell a Camry or two Tercels, as shown
in Figure 2.8(c).
A disjunctive order as a whole can also have a size, which is equivalent to placing
several identical orders. For example, suppose that a buyer has specied size ve for the
order in Figure 2.8(a). Then, she will sell ve cars, and each car will be a Mustang, Tercel,
or Camry. As another example, if she species size ve for the order in Figure 2.8(b), she
will complete ve transactions, and each transaction will be either a purchase of a sport
utility vehicle or a sale of a trailer; for instance, she may end up buying two sport utility
vehicles and selling three trailers.
In addition, a disjunctive order can have a minimal size and size step. For example,
suppose that a dealer is buying Camries for $18,000 and reselling them for $20,000, and
she is interested in bulk transactions that involve at least ten cars. She may place the
order in Figure 2.8(d); its minimal size is ten, and its step is ve. If the minimal size
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of a disjunctive order is the same as the maximal size, it is an all-or-none order. In this
case, it may be an element of another disjunctive order; it may also be an element of a
conjunctive order, described in Section 2.3.2.
If a trader uses quality functions in a disjunctive order, she must specify a function
for every element of a disjunction. If the trader does not specify quality functions, we use
the same default as for simple orders. We utilize quality functions not only for selecting
the best ll for each element of a disjunction, but also for selecting among lls for dierent
elements. For example, suppose that a trader has placed the disjunction in Figure 2.8(b),
and that she has specied a quality function Qualb for the buy element and Quals for the
sell element. Suppose further that she has found an old Explorer for $2,500, and that she
can sell the trailer for $2,200. If Qualb(Explorer, $2,500) > Quals(Trailer, $2,200), the
trader prefers the purchase of the Explorer to the sale of the trailer.
To summarize, a disjunctive order consists of ve parts:
 Set of all-or-none orders, Order1;Order2; : : : ;Orderk
 Optional permission for price averaging
 Overall order size, Max
 Minimal acceptable size, Min
 Size step, Step
A multi-ll M-Fill matches a disjunctive order if we can decompose it into m multi-lls,
denoted Sub-Fill1, Sub-Fill2; : : : ; Sub-Fillm, that match elements of the disjunction and
satisfy the following constraints.
 Min  m  Max, and m is divisible by Step
 Every multi-ll Sub-Fillj matches some element of the disjunction; that is,
for every j 2 [1::m], there is l 2 [1::k] such that Sub-Fillj matches Orderl.
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 If the order does not allow price averaging, then
M-Fill  Sub-Fill1 + Sub-Fill2 + : : : + Sub-Fillm.
If the order allows price averaging, then
M-Fill includes the same items as Sub-Fill1 + Sub-Fill2 + : : : + Sub-Fillm,
and Pay(M-Fill) = Pay(Sub-Fill1 + Sub-Fill2 + : : : + Sub-Fillm).
For example, suppose that a trader has placed the disjunctive order in Figure 2.8(c),
and specied that its overall size is six and its minimal acceptable size is three. Then,
the multi-ll (Camry, $16,000, −2), (Tercel, $11,500, −2) matches the order since we can
decompose this multi-ll into three parts:
(Camry, $16,000, −1) + (Camry, $16,000, −1) + (Tercel, $11,500, −2).
The rst and second parts match the left element of the disjunction, and the third part
matches the right element. After completing this transaction, we reduce the size of the
disjunctive order, as shown in Figure 2.9.
2.3.2 Conjunctive orders
A trader places a conjunctive order if she needs to complete several transactions together.
For example, if a customer wants to sell her old Tercel and buy a new Echo, she may
place the order in Figure 2.10(a). As another example, if a trader plans to buy a sport
utility vehicle, trailer, and boat, she may place the order in Figure 2.10(b).
We have to guarantee that the trader gets a ll for all elements of a conjunction at
the same time. For example, the conjunction in Figure 2.10(a) can simultaneously trade
with two simple orders (Figure 2.11a). As a more complex example, it can be a part of a
transaction that involves several conjunctive orders (see Figures 2.11b and 2.11c).
A disjunctive order may be an element of a conjunction. For example, if a customer
wants to buy a trailer, boat, and one of several alternative vehicles, she can place the order
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Figure 2.9: Example of a transaction that involves a disjunctive order.
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Figure 2.10: Examples of conjunctive orders.
in Figure 2.12(a). Furthermore, a conjunctive order may be an element of a disjunction,
and a trader may nest several conjunctions and disjunctions (Figure 2.12b).
If a trader species sizes for some elements of a conjunctive order, these elements
must be all-or-none. For example, a customer may place an order to sell an old Tercel
and buy two new Echoes (Figure 2.13a). As another example, she may sell a Tercel and
buy two new cars, where each new car is either an Echo or a Civic (Figure 2.13b).
A conjunctive order as a whole may have a size, which is equivalent to placing several
identical orders; in addition, it may have a minimal size and size step. For instance, if a
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Figure 2.11: Example transactions that involve conjunctive orders.
trader places the order in Figure 2.14(a), she may complete two, four, or six conjunctive
transactions; each transaction will involve selling a Tercel and buying an Echo. If the
minimal size of a conjunctive order is the same as the overall size, then it is an all-or-none
order, and it can be an element of a disjunction or another conjunction.
When a trader places a conjunctive order, she is usually interested in the price of
the overall transaction rather than the prices of its elements. For example, suppose that a
customer is selling her old Tercel and buying an Echo, and she is willing to spend $3,000
for this transaction. She may sell the Tercel for $9,000 and buy an Echo for $12,000;
alternatively, she may sell her old car for $8,000 and buy a new one for $11,000.
We allow two mechanisms for specifying a price limit for the overall transaction.
First, a trader can set a payment limit for a conjunctive order, along with price limits for
its elements. For instance, she may place the order shown in Figure 2.14(b); in this case,
she wants to get at least $5,000 for her old Tercel and pay at most $15,000 for a new
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Figure 2.12: Examples of nested disjunctions and conjunctions.
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Figure 2.13: Examples of size specications in conjunctive orders.
Echo, and her total cash spending must be at most $3,000. Thus, she is willing to sell
her Tercel for $5,000 and buy an Echo for $8,000, and she is also willing to sell her car for
$12,000 and buy a new one for $15,000. If the overall conjunctive order has a size, then
the price limit is for size 1. For example, if a buyer species a size of ten for a conjunctive
order and trades all ten, then the overall payment will by $80,000, not $8,000. Recall that
the units of payment may dier from price (Section 2.2.3); for example, mortgage brokers
may express the price as an interest rate, and the overall payment for a conjunctive order
as a dollar amount.
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Figure 2.14: Conjunctive orders with a size specication (a) and payment limit (b).
Second, a trader can specify a price limit for each element of a conjunction, and
indicate that she will accept any multi-ll that leads to the same total payment, even if
the prices of individual elements do not satisfy the price limits. This option is similar
to price averaging for simple orders, described in Section 2.2.4. For example, suppose
that a trader uses this option for the order in Figure 2.12(a). If she gets a Sequoia with
a trailer and boat, the total payment must be at most $30; 000 + $2; 000 + $3; 000 =
$35; 000. If she gets an Explorer instead of a Sequoia, the total payment must be at most
$27; 000 + $2; 000 + $3; 000 = $32; 000.
In addition, a trader can specify a multi-ll quality function for a conjunctive order.
For instance, suppose that a trader has placed the order in Figure 2.13(a), and she prefers
Sequoia to Explorer. Then, her quality function must satisfy the following constraint:
Qualm((Explorer, $27,000, 1), (Trailer, $2,000, 1), (Boat, $3,000, 1))
< Qualm((Sequoia, $30,000, 1), (Trailer, $2,000, 1), (Boat, $3,000, 1)).
A trader can also specify quality functions for elements of a conjunction, but we do not use
them for selecting the best ll; their only use is to reject matches with negative quality.
To summarize, a conjunctive order consists of seven parts:
 Set of all-or-none orders, Order1;Order2; : : : ;Orderk
 Overall payment limit, Pay-Max
 Multi-ll quality function, Qualm
 Optional permission for price averaging
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 Overall order size, Max
 Minimal acceptable size, Min
 Size step, Step
We next dene a multi-ll that matches a conjunctive order. We rst consider a
conjunction of size one and then generalize the denition to larger sizes. A multi-ll
M-Fill matches a conjunctive order of size one if it can be decomposed into multi-lls for
the elements of the conjunction, denoted Sub-Fill1; Sub-Fill2; : : : ; Sub-Fillk, that satisfy
the following conditions.
 For every j 2 [1::k]; Sub-Fillj matches Orderj
 If the order does not allow price averaging, then
M-Fill  Sub-Fill1 + Sub-Fill2 + : : : + Sub-Fillk.
If the order allows price averaging, then
M-Fill includes the same items as Sub-Fill1 + Sub-Fill2 + : : : + Sub-Fillk,
and Pay(M-Fill) = Pay(Sub-Fill1 + Sub-Fill2 + : : : + Sub-Fillk).
 Pay(M-Fill)  Pay-Max
 Qualm(M-Fill)  0
For example, the multi-ll (Tercel, $9,000,−1), (Echo, $12,000, 1), (Civic, $12,000, 1)
matches the conjunctive order in Figure 2.13(b). To show the match, we decompose it
into two parts:
(Tercel; $9; 000;−1) + (Echo; $12; 000; 1); (Civic; $12; 000; 1).
The rst part matches the sell element of the conjunction, and the second part matches
the disjunctive buy.
If a conjunctive order includes a size specication, then a multi-ll M-Fills matches
the order if it can be decomposed into multi-lls M-Fill1;M-Fill2; : : : ;M-Fillsize that
satisfy the following conditions.
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Sell:
Buy:
1 Sequoia,
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Figure 2.15: Example of a chain order. The trader rst sells two Tercels and a Rio, then
purchases a Sequoia, and nally acquires a trailer.
 Min  size  Max
 size is divisible by Step
 For every l 2 [1::size];M-Filll matches the conjunctive order
 If the order does not allow price averaging, then
M-Fills  M-Fill1 + M-Fill2 + : : : + M-Fillsize.
If the order allows price averaging, then
M-Fills includes the same items as M-Fill1 + M-Fill2 + : : : + M-Fillsize,
and Pay(M-Fills) = Pay(M-Fill1 + M-Fill2 + : : : + M-Fillsize).
For instance, the conjunctive order in Figure 2.14(a) matches the multi-ll (Tercel,
$9,000, −2), (Echo, $12,000, 2), which can be decomposed into two parts:
(Tercel, $9,000, −1), (Echo, $12,000, 1) + (Tercel, $9,000, −1), (Echo, $12,000, 1).
2.3.3 Chain orders
The chain-order mechanism allows execution of several transactions in a sequence. To
illustrate it, suppose that a buyer plans to sell two Tercels and a Rio, and to purchase a
Sequoia. Because of budgetary constraints, she wants to sell all three cars before buying a
new one. Suppose further that a buyer wishes to acquire a trailer after buying a Sequoia.
In Figure 2.15, we show the sequence of a buyers transactions, which form a chain order.
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Figure 2.16: Chain order with two simple orders, two disjunctions, and a conjunction.
Formally, a chain order is a directed acyclic graph; its nodes are orders, and edges
are temporal constraints. If the graph includes an edge from order1 to order2, we can
execute order2 only after we have completely lled order1. For instance, we cannot
execute a buyer’s buy orders before she sells her Rio and both Tercels.
The elements of a chain order may be combinatorial orders; that is, the chain may
include disjunctive orders, conjunctive orders, and even other chains. We do not impose
any restrictions on the elements of a chain; in particular, they may not be all-or-none.
In Figure 2.16, we show a chain that includes two simple orders, two disjunctions, and a
conjunction.
If a trader cancels an element of a chain without getting a ll, she may want to
execute the following orders; alternatively, she may want to cancel them. For each edge
in the chain, the trader has to specify whether the cancellation of the earlier order causes
the cancellation of the later one; in Figure 2.15, we show such specications. In this
example, if a buyer cancels either sale, she is still interested in buying a Sequoia. On the
other hand, if she cancels the purchase of a Sequoia, she will not buy a trailer. As another
example, the removal of the leftmost disjunction in Figure 2.16 will cause the cancellation
of all buy orders.
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Sell:
Sell:
Buy: Buy:
2 Tercels
1 Rio
1 Sequoia 1 Trailer
Figure 2.17: Active and inactive elements of a chain order. Thick boxes mark active
orders, which can lead to immediate trades.
When placing a chain order, a trader may specify its size, which is equivalent to
placing several identical orders. For example, if a buyer species that the size of her order
in Figure 2.15 is two, she may end up selling four Tercels and two Rios, and buying two
Sequoias and two trailers. On the other hand, a chain cannot have a minimal size or size
step.
To summarize, a chain order consists of the following parts:
 Set of orders
 Temporal constraints that form a directed acyclic graph
 \Keep" or \cancel" specication for each constraint
 Overall order size
Since the execution of a chain includes several steps, it cannot be an all-or-none order;
hence, it cannot be an element of a disjunctive or conjunctive order.
Intuitively, some elements of a chain are inactive; that is, they cannot lead to a
trade. An element becomes active after the execution of all preceding elements. We
illustrate this concept in Figure 2.17, where thick boxes mark active orders. The use of
chain orders is a special case of activating an order upon certain conditions. We have
considered three types of activation conditions in the implemented system: completion
of the preceding orders in a chain, reaching a pre-set time, and a request from the user.
A related problem is to develop a more general activation mechanism, which we plan to
address in future research.
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Chapter 3
Order Representation
We have built an exchange system for a special case of the automated trading problem.
We describe the semantics of orders in the implemented exchange, and then explain its
functionality and overall architecture.
3.1 Item sets
We rst describe the representation of item sets and prices in the implemented system,
and discuss the related limitations. The representation is less general than the formal
model in Chapter 2. In particular, it limits possible item sets and does not allow the use
of price and quality functions.
3.1.1 Buy item sets
A buyer may specify a set I of multiple items, but possible sets are limited by the rep-
resentation. A buyer has to give a set of acceptable values for each attribute, which is
called an attribute set. Thus, if the market includes n attributes, the buy-order descrip-
tion contains n attribute sets, and the set I is a Cartesian product of these attribute sets.
For example, a buyer may indicate that she wants a Mustang or Corvette, the acceptable
colors are red, silver, and black, the car should be made in 1998 or later, and it should
have no more than 30,000 miles.
To give a formal denition, suppose that the set of all possible values for the rst
attribute is M1, the set of all values for the second attribute is M2, and so on, which
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means that the market set of all possible items is M = M1M2 : : :Mn. The buyer has
to specify a set I1 of values for the rst attribute, where I1  M1, a set of values for the
second attribute, I2  M2, and so on. The resulting item set I is the Cartesian product
of the specied sets:
I = I1  I2  : : : In:
For instance, the buyer has specied the following item set in the automobile example:
I = fMustang; Corvetteg  fred; silver; blackg  f1998; 1999; : : :g  [0 : : : 30,000]:
Note that an item set in the implemented matcher must be a Cartesian product of at-
tribute sets. For example, a buyer cannot describe an item set that includes red Mustangs
and black Corvettes, but no black Mustangs.
3.1.2 Sell item sets
A sell order has to include a specic item, rather than a set of acceptable items. For
example, a seller can order the sale of a red Mustang made in 1998, which has 10,000
miles; however, she cannot oer a set of various Mustangs made between 1990 and 2000.
If she is selling multiple dierent cars, she needs to place multiple orders.
This limitation is based on the assumption that sellers usually oer specic items;
however, some real-world markets do not satisfy this assumption. In particular, it creates
problems for trading of services, such as package delivery or carpet cleaning. For instance,
a maid service may oer to clean any carpets, rather than a specic carpet in a specic
building.
To describe an item, the seller has to provide a value for each attribute; for ex-
ample, the seller may dene the model as Mustang, the color as red, and so on. If the
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market includes n attributes, then the denition of a sell item is a sequence of n values,
(i1; i2; : : : ; in), where i1 is the value of the rst attribute, i2 is for the second attribute,
and so on. For example, the seller would dene her car as (Mustang; red; 1998; 10,000).
3.1.3 Cartesian products
When a trader places an order, she has to specify a set of acceptable values for each
market attribute, which is called an attribute set . Thus, if a market includes n attributes,
the order description contains n attribute sets. For example, a buyer may indicate that
she is purchasing an Echo or Tercel, the acceptable colors are white, silver, and gold, the
car should be made after 1998, and it should have at most 30,000 miles.
To give a formal denition, suppose that the set of all possible values for the rst
attribute is M1, the set of all values for the second attribute is M2, and so on, which means
that the market set is M = M1 M2  : : :Mn. The trader has to specify a set I1  M1
of values for the rst attribute, a set I2  M2 of values for the second attribute, and so
on. The resulting set I of acceptable items is the Cartesian product of the attribute sets:
I = I1  I2  : : : In.
For instance, a buyer may specify the following item set:
I = fEcho; Tercelg  fwhite; silver; goldg  [1999 : : : 2001] [0 : : : 30; 000].
3.1.4 Unions and lters
A trader can dene an item set I as the union of several Cartesian products. For example,
if she wants to buy either a used Camry or a new Echo, she can specify the following set:
I = fCamryg  fwhite; silver; goldg  [1995 : : : 2001] [0 : : : 30; 000]
[ fEchog  fwhite; silver; goldg  f2001g  [0 : : : 200].
Furthermore, the trader can indicate that she wants to avoid certain items; for instance,
a superstitious user may want to avoid black cars with 13 miles on the odometer. In this
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case, the user has to provide a lter function that prunes undesirable items. Formally, it
is a Boolean function on the set I that gives false for unwanted items. We implement
it by an arbitrary C++ procedure that inputs an item description and returns true or
false. To summarize, the representation of an item set consists of two parts:
 A union of Cartesian products,
I = I11  I12  : : : I1n [ I21  I22  : : : I2n [ : : : [ Ik1  Ik2  : : : Ikn
 A lter function, Filter : I ! ftrue; falseg,
implemented by a C++ procedure.
We do not impose restrictions on lter functions; however, if a lter prunes too many
items, the system may miss some matches. To avoid this problem, a user should choose
Cartesian products that tightly bound the set of acceptable items.
3.1.5 Attribute sets
A buyer may use specic values or ranges; for example, she may specify a desired year as
2001 or as a range from 1998 to 2001. Note that ranges work only for numeric attributes,
such as year and mileage.
The specication of a market may include certain standard sets of values, such as
\all sports cars" or \all American cars", and the buyer may use them in her orders. For
example, she may place an order for any American car.
Moreover, the buyer may use unions and intersections in her specication of at-
tribute sets. For instance, suppose that a buyer is interested in Mustangs, Corvettes, and
European sports cars; suppose further that we have dened a standard set that includes
all European cars, and another standard set that comprises all sports cars. Then, the
buyer can represent the desired set of models as follows:
fMustang; Corvetteg [ (European-cars\ Sports-cars):
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reduce-set(attribute values a1; a2; : : : ; an)
The algorithm inputs a disjunctive attribute set of n values.
Return a1 [ a2 [ : : : [ an
Figure 3.1: Simplifying a disjunctive attribute set. The algorithm returns the union of
the attribute values.
A simplication mechanism within the system reduces the complexity of disjunctive
attribute sets, thus improving eciency. For example, the attribute set \1{5 or 4{8"
simplies to "1{8." This mechanism is located outside the matcher module, in the user
interface, we give the algorithm in Figure 3.1.
Formally, an attribute set may be:
 A specic value, such as Mustang or 2001
 A range of values, such as 1998{2001
 A standard set of values, such as all European cars
 An intersection of several attribute sets
 A union of several sets
3.2 Price, quality, and size
We now explain the representation of price functions, quality functions, and order sizes.
3.2.1 Price
If a price function is a constant, a trader species it by a numeric value, called a price
threshold . If an item set is the union of several Cartesian products, the trader can
specify a separate threshold for each product. For instance, if a buyers item set is the
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union of used Camries and new Echoes, she can indicate that she is paying $15,000 for
a Camry and $12,000 for an Echo. If several Cartesian products overlap, and the trader
has dened dierent thresholds for these products, then we use the tightest threshold for
their intersection; that is, we use the lowest threshold for buy orders, and the highest
threshold for sell orders.
We specify a price function by an arbitrary C++ procedure that inputs an item and
outputs the corresponding price limit. Note that a trader can specify dierent functions
for dierent orders. If an order includes both a threshold and price function, the system
uses the tighter of the two. For example, if a buyer’s threshold for buying an Echo is
$12,000, and her price function returns $12,500 for a specic vehicle, then the resulting
price limit is $12,000. Price thresholds help to prune unacceptable items, whereas C++
price functions allow more accurate evaluation of the remaining items. If the market
includes monotonic attributes, the price functions must satisfy the monotonicity condition
in Section 2.1.5. Note that if the price depends on \additional data," then dierent orders
with identical item sets may have unequal price limits, requiring alternative price functions
and impacting the eciency.
3.2.2 Quality
The representation of a quality function is also an arbitrary C++ procedure; it inputs an
item description and price, and outputs a numeric quality value. The system includes sev-
eral standard functions, and a trader can select among them and adjust the corresponding
parameters. The system allows specifying dierent quality functions for dierent orders.
If a user does not provide any quality function, the system uses a default quality measure
dened through the price function (Section 2.1.3). All quality functions must be mono-
tonic on price (Section 2.1.3); furthermore, if some attributes are monotonic, the quality
functions must also satisfy the monotonicity condition of Section 2.1.5.
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3.2.3 Size
The implemented size specication is the same as in the general model; it includes the
overall size, minimal acceptable size, and size step. A trader can specify whether the
system should preserve the minimal size in the case of a partial ll; if not, the system
removes the minimal size after a partial ll (see Figure 3.2). The trader can also indicate
whether she accepts multi-lls and allows price averaging.
3.3 Cancellations and inactive orders
We describe three mechanisms for removing an order from the market: immediate can-
cellation, expiration time, and temporary inactivation.
3.3.1 Cancellation
If a trader places an order and does not get a ll, she can later cancel it. If a trader has
placed a combinatorial order, she can cancel the entire order or some of its elements. If
she deletes an element of a disjunctive or conjunctive order, the other elements remain
on market. On the other hand, a cancellation of a chain-order element may cause the
deletion of other elements if the chain includes \cancel" constraints. For instance, the
removal of the middle element in Figure 2.15 causes the cancellation of the rightmost
element.
3.3.2 Expiration time
When placing an order, a trader can specify its expiration time with one-second precision.
If the system does not nd a match by the specied time, it cancels the order. A trader
can also place an \immediate-or-cancel" order, which is removed if there is no immediate
match. When placing a combinatorial order, a trader can specify an expiration time for
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Buy:
6 cars,
at least 3 3 cars
Sell:
Buy:
3 cars,
at least 3
Fill:
3 cars
reduced removed
(a)
Buy:
6 cars,
at least 3 3 cars
Sell:
Fill:
3 cars
reduced removed
(b)
3 cars
Buy:
Figure 3.2: Examples of partial lls. If a trader species a minimal size, she indicates
whether the system should preserve it after a partial ll (a), or remove it after the rst
ll (b).
the whole order, as well as dierent times for its elements. The expiration of the whole
order leads to the removal of all its elements, whereas the expiration of individual elements
does not aect the other elements.
3.3.3 Inactive order
We can mark some orders as inactive, which means that they cannot lead to a trade. We
have introduced this mechanism for eciency; it allows temporary removal of an order
from the trading process without deleting it from the indexing structure. In particular, we
use it to delay trading with inactive elements of a chain. We also enable users to inactivate
their orders by hand, and to specify inactivation and reactivation times. The system allows
inactivation of combinatorial orders, but it does not support selective inactivation of their
elements.
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CHANGE-ORDER(old-order )
Return new-order
20 Echoes,
$11,500
Sell:
$12,000
10 Echoes,
Buy:
Fill
Sell:
10 Echoes,
$11,500
Sell:
$12,000
10 Echoes,
modified
(a) (b)
sizeIf [old-order ] > 10,
then return "no change"
new-order := old-order
price[new-order ] := $12,000
Figure 3.3: Example of an order modication. If the size of the order drops to ten, the
system should increase its price (a). The modication request includes a procedure that
checks the size and adjusts the price (b).
3.4 Modications
A trader can modify her order without removing it from the market. For example, if a
buyer has placed an order to buy a gold Toyota Echo for $11,500 and has not gotten a
ll, she can increase the price to $12,000. As another example, she can change the item
description from \gold Echo" to \any Echo or Tercel." A trader can also dene conditions
that trigger a modication. For instance, suppose that a seller is selling twenty Echoes
for $11,500 each. She can indicate that, if she gets a partial ll of at least ten cars, then
her price increases to $12,000 (Figure 3.3a).
We specify a modication request by a C++ procedure that inputs an order and
returns its modied version; if an order requires no modication, the procedure returns the
\no change" signal. For example, if a seller wants to increase her order price after its size
drops to ten, she can use the procedure in Figure 3.3(b). The system includes standard
modication functions, and a user can select among them and adjust the appropriate
parameters.
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A user can specify an activation and expiration time for a modication request.
When it becomes active, the system invokes the corresponding procedure. If it returns
\no change," the system re-invokes it after any change to the order, which may be caused
by a partial ll or by another modication. If a trader changes her mind, she can manually
remove an old request. The system cancels a request in the following cases:
 The processing of the request has resulted in a modication
 The request has expired
 The corresponding order has been removed from the market
 The user has manually removed the request
A trader can also place an \immediate-or-cancel" request; if it does not result in an
immediate modication, the system does not re-invoke it later.
3.5 Fairness heuristics
If the system identies multiple matches between buy and sell orders, it may need to
choose among them before generating lls. For example, if a buy order matches two
dierent sell orders, the system has to select between the two, and the users usually
expect a \fair"choice. We have used help from Michael Foster, a professional trader
working for PowerLoom Corporation, to identify standard fairness expectations.
First, if the system has found several matches for the same trade, it should prefer
the best-price match. For instance, if a buyer is looking for a sports car and the matcher
has found two dierent orders to sell sports cars, then it has to match the buyer’s buy
order with the cheaper sell.
Second, if several users compete for the same trade, the system should give priority
to the user who oers a better price. For instance, suppose that Seller1 and Seller2 are
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both selling a Corvette, and Seller1’s price is better. Then, the system should ll Seller1’s
order before Seller2’s order. Although traders often view this requirement as dierent
from the rst one, both impose the same constraints on the matching process.
Third, if several traders oer the same price, the system should execute their orders
on a rst-come rst-serve basis. Thus, if Seller1 and Seller2 oer Mustangs for the same
price, and Seller1 has made her oer before Seller2, then Seller1’s sell order should get
priority. Professional traders consider this \chronological" fairness almost as important
as price fairness. When a seller makes a low-price oer in a volatile market, she assumes
a risk and expects to be rewarded with priority over other sellers who follow her lead.
3.6 Conrmations
When placing an order, a trader can provide not only a description used in automated
matching, but also additional information for human traders; for instance, a car dealer
can post a picture of a vehicle. The system enables traders to browse through potential
matches and choose the most desirable trade.
When a user places an order, she can indicate the need for conrmation. In this
case, when the system nds matches, it displays their descriptions; if the user conrms
some of the matches, the system executes the corresponding trades. For example, a buyer
can place an order to buy a silver Corvette and require conrmation; then, she can browse
through matching Corvettes and handpick the best match.
When the system nds a match between a buy and sell order, it checks the need
for conrmation. If neither order requires conrmation, it immediately executes the
trade. If one of the orders needs conrmation, the system noties the corresponding
user and executes the trade upon getting her approval (Figure 3.4a). If both orders
require conrmation, it noties both sides and completes the trade only after getting
both approvals (Figure 3.4b). For example, if a buyer requests conrmation for her
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Corvette order, and a seller sells a Corvette that also needs conrmation, then the system
will complete the transaction only after getting approvals from both the buyer and seller.
If the system nds a multi-order trade, it may need more than two conrmations.
A trader can conrm several dierent matches for her order, which allows the system
to execute any of them. For instance, a buyer may conrm several Corvettes, and then
she will get one of them.
When the system asks users for conrmation, it does not remove the matching orders
from the trading process, and it can nd other matches for them. If a user delays her
conrmation, she may miss a trade, and then the system noties her that the trade is
no longer available (Figure 3.4c). For instance, when the buyer conrms the purchase of
a specic Corvette, she may nd out that someone else has bought it before her. The
system tries to ll orders without conrmation before sending requests for conrmation.
This strategy improves the speed of the trading process and reduces the number of \late"
conrmations.
3.7 User actions
To summarize, a trader can perform six main operations: place an order, cancel an old
order, activate or inactivate an order, place a modication request, cancel an old request,
and conrm a trade. The implemented system does not support changes to modication
requests; if a user needs to change her old request, she should cancel it and place a new one.
We list the main elements of a simple order in Figure 3.5, the elements of a combinatorial
order in Figure 3.6, and the elements of a modication request in Figure 3.7. If a user
does not specify some of the elements, the system uses the corresponding default values.
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Buy order:
with confirmation
Sell order:
without confirmation
Match
Fill
Match is
no longer
available
Sell order:
without confirmation
Match
Buy order:
with confirmation
Fill
Match
Buy order:
with confirmation
Sell order:
with confirmation
Fill
New buy order:
without confirmation
Confirmation
Rejection
(b)
(a)
(c)
Confirmation
Notification
Notification Notification
Confirmation
Confirmation
Notification
Figure 3.4: Trading with conrmations. If one of the matching orders needs conrmation,
the system noties the corresponding trader and waits for her approval (a). If both orders
need conrmation, the system waits for approval from both traders (b). If it nds an
alternative match before getting an approval, it executes the corresponding trade and
later rejects the conrmation (c).
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 Item Set
Union of Cartesian products (no default)
Filter function (by default, no lter)
 Price
Price threshold for each Cartesian product
(by default, −1 for sell orders and +1 for buy orders)
Price function (by default, equal to the threshold)
Quality function (by default, based on the price function)
 Additional data
Data for price, quality, and lter functions (by default, no data)
Information for human traders (by default, no information)
 Size
Overall order size (by default, one)
Minimal acceptable size (by default, one)
Size step (by default, one)
 Activation and expiration
Active or inactive status (by default, active)
Inactivation time (by default, never)
Reactivation time (by default, never)
Expiration time (by default, never)
 Options
Acceptance of multi-lls (by default, accept)
Acceptance of price averaging (by default, accept)
Conrmation request (by default, no conrmation)
Figure 3.5: Elements of a simple order and their default values. When a trader places an
order, she has to specify an item set, and she may optionally specify the other elements.
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 Disjunctive order:
Set of all-or-none orders (no default)
Size (the same as in a simple order)
Activation and expiration (the same as in a simple order)
Acceptance of price averaging (by default, accept)
 Conjunctive order:
Set of all-or-none orders (no default)
Overall payment limit (by default, +1)
Multi-ll quality function (by default, no function)
Size (the same as in a simple order)
Activation and expiration (the same as in a simple order)
Acceptance of price averaging (by default, accept)
 Chain order:
Set of orders (no default)
Ordering constraints (no default)
\Keep" or \cancel" specication for each constraint (by default, \keep")
Overall order size (by default, one)
Figure 3.6: Elements of combinatorial orders.
 Reference to a specic order (no default)
 Modication function that inputs an order and returns either a modied order or
\no change" signal (no default)
 Activation time (by default, immediate)
 Expiration time (by default, never)
Figure 3.7: Elements of a modication request.
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Chapter 4
Indexing Structure
We describe data structures and algorithms for fast identication of matches between buy
and sell orders. We rst explain the overall architecture and then present the mechanism
for fast retrieval of matching orders. We refer to the orders that are currently in the
system as pending orders.
4.1 Architecture
The system consists of a central matcher and multiple user interfaces, which run on
separate machines and communicate over the network using an asynchronous messaging
protocol. We outline the distributed architecture and explain the main functions of the
matcher.
4.1.1 Top-level control
We describe a high-level logic that controls an indexing tree. We discuss dierent strate-
gies for a matching round, and continuous versus periodic clearing. Both the total
throughput of the system, and its response time, depend on the matching strategy chosen.
We consider several trade-os between maximizing the throughput and minimizing the
response time. We also consider the fairness of each strategy.
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engine
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interface
User
interface
User
interface
orders
fills
fills
orde
rs
fills
orders
Figure 4.1: The architecture of the trading system.
 Placing an order
 Canceling an order
 Activating or inactivating an order
 Placing a modication request
 Canceling a modication request
 Conrming a trade
Figure 4.2: Main types of messages from a user interface.
4.1.2 User interfaces
The traders enter their orders through interface machines, which send the orders to the
matcher engine (Figure 4.1). The central engine serves as a trading pit; it nds matches
among orders, generates lls, and sends them to the corresponding interfaces. In Fig-
ure 4.2, we list the main types of messages from interfaces, which correspond to the user
actions supported by the system (Sections 3.3{3.7).
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Market description
Pending orders
Trees with
    orders
index nonindex
orders
List of
Figure 4.3: Main data structures in the matcher engine.
sell: red Mustang, made in 1999, 30,000 miles
sell: white Camry, made in 1998, 42,000 miles
sell: red Echo, made in 1995, 65,000 miles
buy: green Saturn, made in 1997, 58,000 miles
Trees with index orders
buy: any red car, made after 2000
sell: any sports car, made in 2001
buy: any green Mustang, at most 5,000 miles
sell: any Echo, made in 1995
Pending orders
Market description
Attribute 1: Model               Attribute 3: Year
Attribute 2: Color                Attribute 4: Mileage
List of nonindex orders
Figure 4.4: Example of index and nonindex orders.
4.1.3 Matcher engine
The matcher maintains a description of market attributes, a collection of pending orders,
and a queue of scheduled future events (Figure 4.3). It includes a central structure for
indexing of pending orders, implemented by two trees (Section 4.2). This structure allows
indexing of orders with fully specied items; for example, it can include an order to sell a
red Mustang made in 1999, but it cannot contain an order to buy any red car made after
1999. If we can put an order into the indexing structure, we call it an index order . If an
order includes a set of items, rather than a fully specied item, the matcher adds it to an
unordered list of nonindex orders. In Figure 4.4, we give an example of four index orders
and four nonindex orders.
The indexing structure allows fast retrieval of index orders that match a given order.
On the other hand, the system does not identify matches between two nonindex orders.
For example, if the orders are as shown in Figure 4.4, and a trader places an order to buy
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No
Yes
Stop trading?
Stop the matcher
Process every new order
in the queue of incoming
orders (see Figure 4.6)
Start the matcher
For every pending nonindex
order, search for matching 
index orders (see Figure 4.7)
Figure 4.5: Top-level loop of the matcher engine.
a car made after 1997, then the system will nd two matches: \sell red Mustang made in
1999" and \sell white Camry made in 1998."
4.1.4 Matching cycle
In Figure 4.5, we show the main cycle of the matcher, which alternates between parsing
new messages and searching for matches. When it receives a message with a new order,
it immediately searches for matching index orders (Figure 4.6a). If there are no matches,
and the new order is an index order, then the system adds it to the indexing structure.
Similarly, if the matcher lls only part of a new index order, it stores the remaining part in
the indexing structure. If the system gets a nonindex order and does not nd a complete
ll, it adds the unlled part to the list of nonindex orders.
For example, suppose that a seller places an order to sell a red Mustang, made in
1999, with 30,000 miles. The system immediately looks for matching index orders; if it
does not nd a match, it adds the order to the indexing structure. If a buyer later places
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(see Figure 4.6a)
Delete the 
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completely filled?
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new matches?
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(see Figure 4.7)
(b) Modifying an order
Search for index orders
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completely filled?
order?
Is it an index
Yes
Yes No
No
Is the new order
         (see Figure 4.7)
(a) Processing a new order
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Figure 4.6: Addition and modication of an order.
a buy order for a sports car, the system identies the match with a seller’s order, and
informs a buyer and seller that they have exchanged a Mustang.
When the system gets a cancellation message, it removes the specied order from the
market. When it receives a modication message, it makes the corresponding changes to
the specied order (Figure 4.6b). If the changes can potentially lead to new matches, the
system immediately searches for index orders that match the modied order; in Figure 4.8,
we list all modications that can result in new matches. For example, if a seller has placed
an order to sell a Mustang for $18,000, and she later reduces its price to $17,500, then
the system immediately looks for new matches. On the other hand, if she increases the
price to $18,500, the system does not search for matches.
After processing all messages, the system tries to ll pending nonindex orders, which
include not only the new arrivals, but also the old unlled orders. For each nonindex
74
order, it identies matching index orders, as shown in Figure 4.7. For example, consider
the market in Figure 4.4, and suppose that a seller places an order to sell a green Mustang,
made in 2001, with zero miles. Since the market has no matching index orders, the system
adds this new order to the indexing structure. After processing all messages, it tries to
ll the nonindex orders, and determines that a sellers order is a match for the old order
to buy any green Mustang.
In addition to the matching cycle described above, the system may periodically
search for new matches for an unmatched order. For a small-scale market, we can use the
matching condition directly: for each new order, search all old orders for a match, and
select the best match. The complexity of processing an order is linear in the number of
pending orders, which is too slow for large markets.
4.1.5 Matching frequency
The matcher keeps track of the \age" of each order, and uses it to avoid repetitive search
for matches among the same index orders. If it has already tried to nd matches for some
order, the matching process will involve search only among new index orders.
If a nonindex order has been on market for a long time, the system matches it less
frequently than recent orders. We have implemented a mechanism that determines the
intervals between searches for matching index orders; by default, the system increases the
length of an interval between consecutive searches in proportion to an order age. If it does
not nd a match for a new nonindex order, it repeats the search on the next matching
cycle, then after two cycles, then after four cycles, and so on; that is, the intervals between
searches increase as the powers of two.
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4.2 Indexing trees
We have implemented an indexing structure for orders with fully specied items, which
do not include ranges, standard sets, conjunctions, or disjunctions. The structure consists
of two identical trees: one is for buy orders, and the other is for sell orders.
Conceputally, these tree are tries, in which the description of specic orders serves as
strings of equal length. These tries dier from traditional tries in that dierent attributes
have dierent sets of values. In Figure 4.9, we show an indexing tree for sell orders; its
height is equal to the number of market attributes, and each level corresponds to one
of the attributes. The root node encodes the rst attribute, and its children represent
dierent values of this attribute; in Figure 4.9, each child of the root corresponds to some
car model. The nodes at the second level divide the orders by the second attribute, and
each node at the third level corresponds to specic values of the rst two attributes. In
general, a node at level i divides orders by the values of the ith attribute, and each node
at the (i+1)st level corresponds to all orders with a specic value of the rst i attributes.
If some items are not currently on sale, the tree does not include the corresponding nodes;
for instance, if nobody is selling an Echo, the root has no child for Echo.
Every nonleaf node includes a red-black tree that allows fast retrieval of its children
with specic values. For example, the root in Figure 4.9 includes a red-black tree that
indexes its children by model values, as shown in Figure 4.10. A leaf of the indexing tree
includes orders with identical items, which may have dierent prices and sizes. Each leaf
includes a red-black tree that indexes the corresponding orders by price.
4.2.1 Multiple sell trees
The system uses multiple sell trees, where the recent orders are in the rst tree, less recent
orders are in the second tree, and so on. This strategy is faster than the use of times
by a constant factor, since we do not need to look up old nodes and orders. We plan
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on addressing variations of this strategy, as well as the potential problems these changes
could have on market fairness, as part of future research.
4.2.2 Standard sets
If a market includes standard sets of values, such as \all sports cars" and \all American
cars," traders can use them in specifying their orders (Section 3.1). We dene standard
sets separately for each attribute; for instance, the set of American cars belongs to the
\model" attribute. Note that a standard set may be a union of ranges, rather than an
explicit list of values. For example, the set of collectable cars could include all cars made
before the year 1976.
For every attribute, the system maintains a central table of standard sets, which
consists of two parts (Figure 4.11a). The rst part includes a sorted list of values for
every standard set; it allows determining whether a given value belongs to a specic set,
by the binary search in the corresponding list. The second part includes all values that
belong to at least one set; for each value, we store a sorted list of sets that include it.
Every node of an indexing tree also includes a table of standard sets; for example,
the root node in Figure 4.9 includes a table of sets for the rst attribute (Figure 4.11b),
and every \color" node includes a separate table of the second-attribute sets. Every set in
the table includes a list of pointers to its elements in the red-black tree; for instance, the
\American-cars" set points to the \Corvette" and \Mustang" nodes. If the current tree
does not contain elements of some sets, we do not add these sets to the table; for example,
if the market does not include any orders to sell European cars, then the \European-cars"
set is not in the table.
We have implemented the table of sets by a red-black tree, which allows fast addition
and deletion of sets, as well as fast retrieval of all values in a given set. For instance,
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if a buyer looks for American cars, the system retrieves the appropriate children of the
\model" node by nding the \American-cars" set and following its pointers.
4.2.3 Summary data
The nodes of an indexing tree include summary data that help to nd matching orders.
Every node contains the following data about the orders in the corresponding subtree:
 The total number of orders and the total of their sizes
 The minimal and maximal price
 The minimal and maximal value for each numeric attribute
 The time of the latest addition or modication of an order
For example, consider node 2 in Figure 4.9; the subtree rooted in this node includes nine
orders. If the newest of these orders was placed at 2 pm, the summary data in node 2 is
as follows:
 Number of orders: 9  Years: 1998 . . . 2001
 Total size: 14  Mileages: 0 . . . 45,000
 Prices: $13,000 . . . 21,000  Latest addition: 2 pm
We also store the time that the oldest order was added to the subtree; this is done
for the fairness heuristic, to ensure that earlier orders get preference over newer orders.
4.3 Basic tree operations
When a user places, removes, or modies an index order, the system has to update the
indexing tree. We rst describe addition and deletion algorithms, and then explain the
modication procedure.
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4.3.1 Adding a new order
When a user places an index order, the system adds it to the corresponding leaf; for
example, if a seller places an order to sell a black Camry, made in 1999, with 35,000
miles, the system adds it to node 16 in Figure 4.12. If the leaf is not in the tree, the
matcher adds the appropriate new branch; for example, if a seller oers to sell a white
Mustang, it adds the dashed branch in Figure 4.12.
After adding a new order the system modies the summary data of the ancestor
nodes. Note that every summary value is the minimum, maximum, or sum of the order
values. In Figure 4.13, we give the algorithms for updating the number of orders, total
size, and minimal price; the update of the other values is similar. These algorithms
perform one pass from the leaf to the root, and their running time is proportional to the
height of the tree; thus, if the market includes n attributes, the time is O(n).
4.3.2 Deleting an order
When the matcher lls an index order, or a trader cancels her old order, the system
removes the order from the corresponding leaf. If the leaf does not include other orders,
the system deletes it from the indexing tree; for example, if the matcher lls order F in
Figure 4.9, it removes node 18. If the deleted node is the only leaf in some subtree, the
system removes this subtree; for instance, the deletion of order J leads to the removal of
nodes 7, 13, and 20. We show a procedure for removing an order and the corresponding
subtree in Figure 4.14.
After deleting an order, the system updates the summary data in the ancestor nodes.
In Figure 4.15, we give procedures for updating the number of orders, total size, and
minimal price; the modication of the other data is similar. The update time depends on
the number n of market attributes, and on the number of children of the ancestor nodes,
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c1; c2; : : : ; cn. If a summary value is the sum of the order values, the update time is O(n);
if it is the minimum or maximum of order values, the time is O(c1 + c2 + : : : + cn).
4.3.3 Modifying an order
If a trader changes the order size, expiration time, or additional data, the change does
not aect the structure of the indexing tree; however, the system needs to update the
summary data of the ancestor nodes. If a trader modies the price of an order, the system
changes the position of the order in the red-black tree of the leaf, and propagates the price
change to the summary data.
Finally, if a trader changes the item specication, the system treats it as the deletion
of an old order and addition of a new one. For example, suppose that a seller has placed
an order to sell a black Camry, and the indexing tree is as shown in Figure 4.12. If a seller
has entered a wrong color, and she later changes it to white, then the system removes the
order from the leftmost leaf in Figure 4.12 and adds it to the rightmost leaf.
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Delete the index order
the index orders with matching items
Completely filled the
index order?
Completely filled the
given order?
Delete the given order
Yes
Yes
index order
No available
Yes
Does the price of the
selected order match
the given price limit?
No
has not yet been considered, among
Select the highest-quality order, that
Find index orders with matching items
reduce the size of both orders
Generate a fill and 
No
No
Figure 4.7: Search for index orders that match a given order.
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 Changing the item set or additional data
 Increasing the price threshold of a buy order, or decreasing the threshold of a sell
order
 Changing the price function or quality function
 Increasing the overall order size or reducing the minimal acceptable size
 Changing the size step in such a way that the new step is not a multiple of the old
step
 Activating an inactive order
 Allowing multi-lls or price averaging
 Adding new elements to a disjunctive order, or deleting some elements from a con-
junctive order
Figure 4.8: Order modications that lead to new matches.
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Figure 4.9: Indexing tree with seventeen orders.
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Color
......
Color
Model
... ...
2 3 4
Color
......
MustangCamry
Corvette
1
Figure 4.10: Node of an indexing tree. We arrange the attribute values in a red-black
tree, and each value points to the corresponding child in the indexing tree.
ColorColorColor
American:
Japanese:
Sports:
Corvette, Mustang, ...
Camry, Echo, ...
Corvette, Mustang, ...
indexing by attribute value
Camry:
Corvette:
Mustang:
Japanese, ...
American, Sports, ...
American, Sports, ...
...
...
Standard stes
...(a) Central table of standard stes. (b) Standard stes in a node of the indexing tree.
Model
Standard stes
American:
Japanese:
Sports:
Camry Mustang
Corvette
1
Attribute valuesIndexing by set
...
Figure 4.11: Standard sets of values. The market includes a central table of sets (a), and
every node in the indexing tree includes a table of sets for the respective attribute (b).
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Figure 4.12: Adding orders to an indexing tree. We show new orders by dashed ovals. If
the tree does not include the leaf for a new order, the system adds the proper branch.
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add-count(new-size, leaf)
The algorithm inputs the leaf with the newly added order.
node := leaf
Repeat while node 6= nil:
num-orders[node] := num-orders[node] + 1
node := parent[node]
add-size(new-size, leaf)
The algorithm inputs the size of a newly added order
and the corresponding leaf of the indexing tree.
node := leaf
Repeat while node 6= nil:
total-size[node] := total-size[node] + new-size
node := parent[node]
add-price(new-price, leaf)
The algorithm inputs the price of a newly added order
and the corresponding leaf of the indexing tree.
node := leaf
Repeat while node 6= nil and min-price[node] > new-price:
min-price[node] := new-price
node := parent[node]
Figure 4.13: Updating the summary data after addition of an order. We show the update
of the order number (add-count), total size (add-size) and minimal price (add-price).
del-order(order , leaf)
The algorithm inputs an old order and the corresponding leaf.
Remove order from leaf
If leaf includes other orders, then terminate
node := leaf
Repeat while parent[node] 6= nil and node has no children:
ancestor := parent[node]
delete node
node := ancestor
Figure 4.14: Deletion of an order. If it has been the only order in some subtree of the
indexing tree, the system removes this subtree.
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del-count(leaf)
The algorithm inputs the leaf with a deleted order.
node := leaf
Repeat while node 6= nil:
num-orders[node] := num-orders[node] − 1
node := parent[node]
del-size(old-size, leaf)
The algorithm inputs the size of a deleted order,
along with the leaf from which the order is deleted.
node := leaf
Repeat while node 6= nil:
total-size[node] := total-size[node] − old-size
node := parent[node]
del-price(old-price, leaf)
The algorithm inputs the price of a deleted order,
along with the leaf from which the order is deleted.
If min-price[leaf] < old-price, then terminate
Update the minimal price of the leaf:
min-price[leaf] := +1
For every order in the leaf:
If min-price[leaf] > price[order],
then min-price[leaf] := price[order]
Update the minimal price of its ancestors:
node := leaf
Repeat while min-price[node] > old-price
and parent[node] 6= nil and min-price[parent[node]] = old-price:
node := parent[node]
min-price[node] := +1
For every child of node:
If min-price[node] > min-price[child],
then min-price[node] := min-price[child]
Figure 4.15: Updating the summary data after deletion of an order. We show the update
of the order number (del-count), total size (del-size), and minimal price (del-price).
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Chapter 5
Search for Matches
We describe additional data used by the system in the search for matches, and describe
two dierent search strategies. We then discuss the related fairness heuristics, and give
the trade-os involved between minimizing processing time, while ensuring fairness.
5.1 Additional search information
Each order maintains additional data used for simplifying the matching process. This
information includes:
 Time of placement : the time that the order was initially added to the tree
 Time of last modication: the time that the order was last modied
 Time of last search: the time that the order was last searched for a match
We describe two algorithms that identify matches for a given order; the rst al-
gorithm is based on depth-rst search in an indexing tree, and the second is best-rst
search. In Figure 5.1, we present the notation for the order and node structures used by
the algorithms. We give the depth-rst algorithm in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, and the best-rst
algorithm in Figures 5.4{5.6.
5.2 Depth-rst search
The depth-rst algorithm consists of two steps; it rst nds the leaves of an indexing tree
that match a given order (Figure 5.2), and then selects the best matching orders in these
leaves (Figure 5.3).
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5.2.1 Depth-rst search strategies
The depth-rst search used to retrieve matching orders may be implemented using alter-
native schemes listed below, each with its own inherent advantages and drawbacks.
 Exhaustive search: We may use dfs to nd all leaves that match a given order, and
then select matches among them.
 Node limit : We impose a limit on the number of explored leaves; this strategy does
not improve the speed of nding a match, but it limits the time of an unsuccessful
search. Moreover, it limits the time of a successful search that would return too
many nodes.
 Cluster search: We may begin by exploring the subtrees that include more orders,
since they are likely to have more matches. A variation of this strategy is to search
for a large total volume of matches within a space.
 Monotonicity: We rst explore the branches that are likely to have best matches.
This technique works if the user does not specify price and quality functions that
account for monotonicity. For example, if looking for an inexpensive car made after
1970, we begin with cars made in 1970. Note that this strategy is opposite to
fairness, since it looks for the worst model that would satisfy the user’s conditions.
5.2.2 Matching leaves
The algorithm in Figure 5.2 retrieves the matching leaves for a given item set, represented
by a union of Cartesian products and a lter function.
The product-leaves subroutine nds the matching leaves for one Cartesian prod-
uct using depth-rst search in the indexing tree. It identies all children of the root that
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match the rst element of the Cartesian product, and then recursively processes the re-
spective subtrees. For example, suppose that a buyer is looking for a Camry or Mustang
made after 2000, with any color and mileage, and the tree of sell orders is as shown in
Figure 4.9. The subroutine determines that nodes 2 and 4 match the model, and then
processes the two respective subtrees. It identies three matching nodes for the second
attribute, three nodes for the third attribute, and nally four matching leaves; we show
these nodes by thick boxes.
If the system already tried to nd matches for a given order during the previous
execution of the main loop, it skips the subtrees that have not been modied since the
previous search. If the order includes a union of several Cartesian products, the system
calls the product-leaves subroutine for each product. If the order includes a lter
function, the system uses it to prune inappropriate leaves.
If an order matches a large number of leaves, the retrieval may take considerable
time. To prevent this problem, we can impose a limit on the number of retrieved leaves;
for instance, if we allow at most three leaves, and a buyer places an order for any Camry,
then the system retrieves the three leftmost leaves in Figure 4.9. We use this limit to
control the trade-o between speed and quality of matches; a small limit ensures the
eciency but reduces the chances of nding the best match.
5.2.3 Best matches
After the system identies matching leaves, it selects the best matching orders in these
leaves, according to the quality function of the given order. In Figure 5.3, we give an
algorithm that identies the highest-quality matches and completes the respective trades.
It arranges the leaves in a priority queue by the quality of the best unprocessed match in
a leaf. At each step, the algorithm processes the best available match; it terminates after
it lls the given order or runs out of matches.
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For example, consider the tree in Figure 4.9, and suppose that a buyer places an
order for four Camries or Mustangs made after 2000. We suppose further that she uses the
default quality measure, which depends only on price. The system rst retrieves order A
with price $16,000 and size 2, then order B with price $16,500, and nally order O with
price $19,000; we show these orders by thick circles.
If the price and quality functions do not use any extra data, then the sorted order on
price corresponds to the sorted order on quality, as long as quality is monotonic on price;
upon reaching the price and quality limits, we have exhuasted all matches. On the other
hand, if they do use additional information, then the ordering may dier. In this case,
the default strategy may result in selecting suboptimal matches, or missing matches. An
alternative method is to consider all orders in the selected cells, and explicitly sort them
on quality, but it is slower. We plan on developing this algorithm in future research.
We apply the matching test each time a sell order is processed. Note that an order
may not match because of a size requirement or lter function. If the lter does not use
extra any data, we can apply it once to a leaf. If it uses extra data, however, we must
apply it to every order in the leaf. If an order matches, we apply the algorithm given in
Figure 2.3 to determine the matching size of the ll.
5.3 Best-rst search
If some attributes are monotonic, we can use best-rst search to nd optimal matches,
which is usually faster than depth-rst search. The best-rst algorithm uses a node’s
summary data to estimate the quality of matches in the node’s subtree; at each step, it
processes the node with the highest quality estimate.
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5.3.1 Quality estimates
We can compute a quality estimate for a node only if all branching in the node’s subtree
is on monotonic attributes; a node with this property is called monotonic. For example,
node 6 in Figure 4.9 is monotonic; the branching in its subtree is on year and mileage,
which are monotonic attributes. On the other hand, node 2 is not monotonic because its
subtree includes branching on color.
In Figure 5.4, we give a procedure that inputs a monotonic node and constructs the
best possible item that may be present in the node’s subtree, based on the summary data.
To estimate the node’s quality, the system computes the quality of this item traded at the
best possible price from the summary data. For example, consider node 6 in Figure 4.9;
all orders in its subtree include red Camries, and the summary data show that the best
year is 2003, the best mileage is 5,000, and the best price is $13,000. Thus, the system
computes the quality estimate as Qual(Camry; red; 2003; 5,000; $13,000).
5.3.2 Search steps
The best-rst algorithm consists of two steps, similar to the steps of the depth-rst
algorithm. First, it nds all smallest-depth monotonic nodes that match a given order
(Figure 5.5); for example, if a buyer is looking for a Camry or Mustang made after
2000, and the tree of sell orders is as shown in Figure 4.9, then the algorithm retrieves
nodes 5, 6, and 9. Second, it nds the best matching orders in the subtrees of the selected
nodes (Figure 5.6). It arranges the nodes into a priority queue by their quality estimates;
at each step, it processes the highest-quality node. If this node is a leaf, the algorithm
identies the best-price matching order in the leaf and completes the respective trade. If
the node is not a leaf, the algorithm identies its children that match the given order,
and adds them to the priority queue. The algorithm terminates when it lls the given
order or runs out of matches.
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5.4 Fairness heuristics
We consider multiple fairness methods, with the dierence search techniques using dier-
ent heuristics as follows:
 Depth-rst search: We can use the depth rst search with heuristics that guide
toward a better match. The heuristics are the same as in the best-rst search.
 Beam search: Beam search is a variety of the best-rst search, where we limit the
number of the best candidates. We control the trade-o between eciency and
fairness by controlling the breadth limit.
 Best-price search: If the user species quality but no partial quality function, we
may use best-price search as a heuristic. That is, we can nd the best-price search
and hope that it maximizes the quality function.
5.5 Trade-os
When implementing the search, we need to consider trade-os between processing speed
and near-fairness guarantees. The fairness denition is related to the quality function.
The system must always satisfy hard constraints, dened by the item description, lters,
price functions, and quality. On the other hand, the quality ordering is not a hard
constraint, and we may not guarantee nding the best match or ensuring a perfect fairness.
We consider three approaches.
 Disregard quality preferences and time priorities, and guarantee only hard con-
straints. If we use this strategy, we optimize for the speed of market clearing. The
market is not \completely unfair" since we select matches at random and do not
favor specic users.
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 Guarantee fairness, that is, ensure that the \boys-and-girls" condition is never vio-
lated (subsection 2.2.5); this approach involves two separate problems. First, when
searching for a match for a buy order, we need to nd the best match, according to
the quality function. Second, when a buy order nds a sell order, we need to ensure
that there are no better buys that could match with the same sell.
 We consider heuristics that do not guarantee fairness but lead to near-fair choice,
and at the same time take less time that the full guarantee. We consider several
dierent heuristics, which lead to dierent trade-os. We rst consider the approach
with no fairness, then complete fairness, and then discuss several trade-os. The no-
fairness approach is based on the depth-rst search, the complete fairness approach
is based on the best-rst search, and near-fairness is depth-rst search with fairness
heuristics.
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Elements of the order structure:
Price[order] price function
Qual[order] quality function
Filter[order] lter function
Max[order] overall order size
Min[order] minimal acceptable size
Step[order] size step
Place-Time[order] time of placing the order
Search-Time[order] time of the last search for matches
Elements of the indexing-tree node structure:
Min-Price[node] minimal price of orders in the node's subtree
Max-Price[node] maximal price of orders in the node's subtree
Depth[node] depth of the node in the indexing tree
Product-Num[node] number of the matching Cartesian product in a given item set
Quality[node] for a nonleaf node, the quality estimate;
for a leaf, the quality of the best-price unprocessed order
Additional elements of the leaf-node structure:
Item[node] item in the leaf's orders
Current-Order[node] best-price unprocessed order in the leaf
Figure 5.1: Notation for the orders and nodes of an indexing tree. Note that the leaf-node
structure includes the ve elements of the node structure and two additional elements.
We use this notation in the pseudocode in Figures 5.2{5.6.
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matching-leaves(order; root)
The algorithm inputs an order and the root of an indexing tree.
We denote the order's item set by I11:::I1n [ ::: [ Ik1:::Ikn.
Initialize an empty set of matching leaves, denoted leaves
For l from 1 to k,
call product-leaves(Il1:::Iln;Filter[order];Search-Time[order]; root; leaves)
Return leaves
product-leaves(Il1:::Iln;Filter;Search-Time;node; leaves)
The subroutine inputs a Cartesian product Il1:::Iln, a lter function, the previous-search time,
a node of the indexing tree, and a set of leaves. It nds the matching leaves in the node's subtree,
and adds them to the set of leaves.
If Search-Time is larger than node's time of the last order addition, then terminate
If node is a leaf and Filter(Item[node]) = true, then add node to leaves
If node is not a leaf:
Identify all children of node that match IDepth[node]+1
For each matching child,
call product-leaves(Il1:::Iln;Filter;Search-Time; child; leaves)
Figure 5.2: Retrieval of matching leaves. The algorithm identies the leaves of an indexing
tree that match the item set of a given order. The product-leaves subroutine uses
depth-rst search to retrieve the matching leaves for one Cartesian product.
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leaf-matches(order, leaves)
The algorithm inputs an order and matching leaves of an indexing tree.
Initialize an empty priority queue of matching leaves, denoted queue,
which prioritizes the leaves by the quality of the best-price unprocessed order
For each leaf in leaves:
Set Current-Order[leaf] to the rst order among leaf 's orders, sorted by price
Call leaf-priority(order; leaf; queue)
While Max[order]  Min[order] and queue is nonempty:
Set leaf to the highest-priority leaf in queue, and remove it from queue
match := Current-Order[leaf]
Set Current-Order[leaf] to the next order among leaf 's orders, sorted by price
Call trade(order;match)
Call leaf-priority(order; leaf; queue)
If Max[order] < Min[order], then remove order from the market
Else, set Search-Time[order] to the current time
leaf-priority(order; leaf; queue)
The subroutine inputs the given order, a matching leaf, and the priority queue of leaves. If the
order's price matches the price of the leaf's best-price unprocessed order, then the leaf is added to
the queue.
match := Current-Order[leaf]
If match = none, then terminate (no unprocessed orders in leaf)
If order is a buy order, then price := fill-price(Price[order];Price[match]; Item[leaf])
Else, price := fill-price(Price[match];Price[order]; Item[leaf])
If price = none, then terminate (no orders with acceptable price)
Quality[leaf] := Qual[order](Item[leaf]; price)
Add leaf to queue, prioritized by Quality
trade(order;match)
The subroutine inputs the given order and the highest-quality order with matching item and price.
If the sizes of these two orders match, the subroutine completes the trade between them.
If Search-Time[order] > Place-Time[match], then terminate
size := fill-size(Max[order];Min[order];Step[order];Max[match];Min[match];Step[match])
If size = none, then terminate
Complete the trade between order and match
Max[order] := Max[order]− size
Max[match] := Max[match]− size
If Max[match] < Min[match], then remove match from the market
Figure 5.3: Retrieval of matching orders. The algorithm nds the highest-quality matches
for a given order and completes the corresponding trades. The leaf-priority subroutine
adds a given leaf to the priority queue, arranged by the quality of a leaf’s best-price
unprocessed match. The trade subroutine completes the trade between the given order
and the best available match.
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best-item(node)
The algorithm inputs a monotonic node of an indexing tree.
For m from 1 to Depth[node]:
Set im to the mth-attribute value on the path from the root to node
For m from Depth[node] + 1 to n:
Set im to the best value of the mth attribute in node's summary data
Return (i1; :::; in)
Figure 5.4: Construction of the best possible item. The algorithm inputs a monotonic
node and generates the best item that may be present in the subtree rooted at the node.
matching-nodes(order; root)
The algorithm inputs an order and the root of an indexing tree.
We denote the order's item set by I11:::I1n [ ::: [ Ik1:::Ikn.
Initialize an empty set of matching monotonic nodes, denoted nodes
For l from 1 to k, call product-nodes(Il1:::Iln;Search-Time[order]; root;nodes)
Return nodes
product-nodes(Il1:::Iln;Search-Time;node;nodes)
The subroutine inputs a Cartesian product Il1 ::: Iln, the previous-search time, a node of the
indexing tree, and a set of monotonic nodes. It nds the matching monotonic nodes in the subtree
rooted at the given node, and adds them to the set of monotonic nodes.
If Search-Time is larger than node's time of the last order addition, then terminate
If node is monotonic:
Product-Num[node] := l
Add node to nodes
If node is not monotonic:
Identify all children of node that match IlDepth[node]+1
For each matching child, call product-nodes(Il1:::Iln;Search-Time; child;nodes)
Figure 5.5: Retrieval of matching monotonic nodes. The algorithm identies the smallest-
depth monotonic nodes that match the item set of a given order. The product-nodes
subroutine uses depth-rst search to retrieve the matching monotonic nodes for one Carte-
sian product.
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node-matches(order, nodes)
The algorithm inputs an order and matching monotonic nodes of an indexing tree.
Initialize an empty priority queue of matching nodes, denoted queue,
which prioritizes the nodes by their quality estimates
For each node in nodes, call node-priority(order;node; queue)
While Max[order]  Min[order] and queue is nonempty:
Set node to the highest-priority node in queue, and remove it from queue
If node is a leaf:
match := Current-Order[node]
Set Current-Order[node] to the next order among node's orders, sorted by price
Call trade(order;match)
Call leaf-priority(order;node; queue)
If node is not a leaf:
l := Product-Num[node]
Identify all children of node that match IlDepth[node]+1
For each matching child:
If child is a leaf and Filter(Item[child]) = true:
Set Current-Order[child] to the rst order among child's orders, sorted by price
Call leaf-priority(order, child, queue)
If child is not a leaf:
Product-Num[child] := l
Call node-priority(order, child, queue)
If Max[order] < Min[order], then remove order from the market
Else, set Search-Time[order] to the current time
node-priority(order;node; queue)
The subroutine inputs the given order, a matching monotonic node, and the priority queue of nodes.
If the order may have matches in the node's subtree, then the node is added to the priority queue.
i := best-item(node)
If order is a buy order, then price := fill-price(Price[order];Min-Price[node]; i)
Else, price := fill-price(Max-Price[node];Price[order]; i)
If price = none, then terminate
Quality[node] := Qual[order](i; price)
Add node to queue, prioritized by Quality
Figure 5.6: Retrieval of matching orders. The algorithm nds the best matches for a
given order and completes the corresponding trades. The node-priority subroutine
adds a nonleaf node to the priority queue, arranged by quality estimates. The algorithm
also uses four other subroutines: fill-price (Figure 2.3), leaf-priority (Figure 5.3),
trade (Figure 5.3), and best-item (Figure 5.4).
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Although researchers have long realized the importance of exchange markets, they have
not applied the exchange model to trading complex commodities. The reported work is a
step toward the development of automated complex-commodity exchanges, based on the
formal model proposed by Johnson [2001], Hu [2002], and Gong [2002].
We have dened price and quality functions, which allow traders to specify price
constraints and preference among potential trades, and developed algorithms for fast
identication of highest-quality matches between buy and sell orders. These algorithms
help to maximize the satisfaction of traders and enforce \fair" choices among available
matches, which are consistent with nancial-industry rules of fair trading.
The implemented system supports markets with up to 300,000 orders, and it pro-
cesses hundreds of new orders per second. Its speed is close to the speed of the earlier
versions of the system, which did not use price and quality functions, and did not guar-
antee nding best matches.
On the negative side, the system does not allow for bulk discounts, barter trading,
or matches between two nonindex orders. These concepts are commonly found in today’s
markets, and we plan to address them as part of future research. In addition, we are
currently working on a distributed version of the exchange, which will improve scalability;
it will include a central matcher and multiple preprocessing modules, whose roles are
similar to that of stock brokers on Wall Street.
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